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Neighboring Nations Meet To Discuss B-H

AU0902134394 Paris AFP in English 1303 GMT 9 Feb 94

[By Jean-Michel Stoullig]

[Text] Geneva, Feb 9 (AFP)—Foreign ministers from seven countries neighbouring ex-Yugoslavia met here Wednesday [9 February] to discuss the Bosnian crisis amid calls for NATO air strikes as Austria called for "the necessary action" to halt the carnage.

Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock told the UN Human Rights Commission here before the ministers' meeting that "such terrible crimes cannot be accepted by civilized societies at the end of the 20th century." "The international comunity must take the necessary action to stop them," he said.

Wednesday's talks here coincided with a meeting in Brussels of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ambassadors debating whether to give the Bosnian Serbs a deadline to lift the siege of Sarajevo or face air strikes by the alliance's warplanes.

But Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, who had been invited here by international mediators David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, decided to stay in Ankara to "remain close to his government" pending any NATO decision, an official said. Pro-Moslem Turkey is a NATO member and on Wednesday said it was prepared to take part in any NATO air strikes in Bosnia.

Pro-Serb Greece meanwhile said it would go along with any NATO decision.

Ministers in attendance at the talks here were Mock, Albania's Alfred Serreqi, Bulgaria's Stanislav Daskalov, Greece's Karolos Papoulias, Italy's Beniamino Andreatta, Romania's Teodor Melescanu and Hungary's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Janos Hermann.

None made a statement as they went into the meeting, which was also to focus on a 60-page document detailing the economic effects on the Balkans of the 1992 trade embargo against Belgrade.

Owen and Stoltenberg want "to have the ministers' input on the issues of reconstruction and recovery in advance of a settlement," an official said. No statement was due to be issued after the session.

The meeting had been scheduled before Saturday's massacre of 68 Bosnians at the Sarajevo market which triggered the latest debate on whether to use air power against Bosnian Serbs.

Meanwhile, Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic held talks with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic ahead of a fresh round of multilateral Geneva talks from Thursday aimed at reaching a political settlement. They said at the half-way stage that their discussions had been "constructive."

Granic said they had covered ways to end hostilities between Bosnian Croat forces and the mainly Moslem Bosnian Government Army in central Bosnia. The Zagreb government has denied UN allegations that its own troops are engaged in the fighting.

Croatia itself will not be represented at Thursday's talks here, which are intended to work out "confidence-building measures" by the three sides to the Bosnian conflict, represented by Silajdzic, Radovan Karadzic for the Bosnian Serbs and Mile Akmadzic for the Bosnian Croats.

Croatia's Granic, Bosnia's Silajdzic Hold Talks

Hostilities 'Must End Immediately'

LD0902152094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Report by Tihomir Vinkovic from Geneva]

[Text] Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, and Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic ended their first round of talks at about 1300. Their tete-a-tete meeting took place in a constructive atmosphere at the Richmond hotel. The two ministers came to the conclusion that the hostilities between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina must end immediately. Future relations will be determined on the basis of an agreement.

The future status of Muslim and Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina appears to be controversial. Proposals have ranged from the organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina along cantonal lines to the setting up of republics within a Bosnia-Herzegovina federation.

The talks, according to reports, were the first to be held in a completely frank atmospohere and could form a basis for a solution.

Croatian Minister Granic explained the features and basic guidelines of the Croatian-FRY statement on the normalization of relations: It deals exclusively with humanitarian issues and those connected with communications and is in no way targeted against Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The negotiating circles say that the international community as well as influential countries have been putting pressure on both sides to reach an agreement. The talks held so far appear to have taken this course.

Minister Granic will this afternoon meet the Austrian and Romanian foreign ministers who are attending the talks between Cochairmen Owen and Stoltenberg and representatives from the countries neighboring the former Yugoslavia. He is also expected to meet Silajdzic once again late this evening.

Granic Presents Croatian View

LD0902183694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Report by Tihomir Vinkovic from Geneva]

[Excerpt] In his talks with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and Austrian Foreign Minister Mock in Geneva today, Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, presented the Croatian standpoint on the possible future of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A union of republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina would consist of three republics in which one of the three constituent nations would be in the majority. Minority rights in each of the republics in the union would be guaranteed and supervised by the international community. In areas where they make up a compact body, the minorities could be organized in areas with a certain degree of autonomy. In case the union of republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina disintegrates, each republic would have to guarantee the same minority rights as is envisaged for the union.

The Croatian view is identical to the EU proposal, known as the Kinkel-Juppe plan. Croatia again reiterated its proposal that the international community should supervise the border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and carry out inspection of military formations. Of course, all hostilities must first cease. [passage omitted]

Karadzic 'Only' Prepared To Discuss Massacre

AU0902204494 Paris AFP in English 2021 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Geneva, Feb 9 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic arrived here Wednesday [9 February] for talks with the other two warring parties, amid a growing threat of NATO air strikes against his faction.

Karadzic was enigmatic as he arrived here, declining all comment other than saying "I am only prepared to talk about the massacre in Sarajevo" which killed 68 people on Saturday [5 February].

The new round of talks due Thursday [10 February] has been scheduled for weeks, well before the massacre in a Sarajevo market place which has sparked intense international pressure for air strikes. [passage omitted]

To Announce 'Conditions' for Talks

AU1002104894 Paris AFP in English 1038 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Text] Geneva, Feb 10 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said here Thursday [10 February] he would not take part in peace talks until the massacre last Saturday in Sarajevo was properly investigated to determine who was responsible. He spoke as he was entering the talks here, and said he would tell the Bosnian and Croatian delegations his conditions for proceeding.

Karadzic looked drawn as he entered the UN headquarters. The Bosnian Serbs were threatened Wednesday with NATO air strikes if they do not withdraw their heavy artillery from around Sarajevo by February 21.

"I just want to say that we are not going to go on with the conference until we get an international investigatory body to investigate and resolve the Sarajevo massacre," Karadzic told reporters as he went in for talks with mainly Moslem Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croat delegations.

UN forces in Sarajevo have said a bombing Friday in Sarajevo that killed eight people was carried out by Serb artillery but have not determined who was responsible for the Saturday attack in a Sarajevo market that left 68 dead and aroused the ire of the international community.

"I would remind you that Moslems have stage-managed the killing in the bread queue killing 18 of their own people," he said, referring to a previous civilian bombing in Sarajevo for which the Moslems and Serbs each blame each other. He also said the Moslems were responsible for shooting down an Italian plane in September 1992.

Karadzic said the problem was that only Yugoslavia "got sanctions" after these incidents. "We don't have any reason to go on with the conference until we get a commission to investigate evidence in single circumstances and to say publicly who is responsible for this massacre," Karadzic said.

He said he would tell the Bosnian and Croatian delegations: "We are going to tell them we demand an investigatory body to get findings and to make this public."

Owen Optimistic on Withdrawal of Artillery

LD1002130994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1210 GMT 10 Feb 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Geneva, Feb 10 (TANJUG)—Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Lord Owen on Thursday said he believed chances were good that the agreement on a ceasefire and the withdrawal of artillery from positions around Sarajevo and its placing under the control of U.N. peace-keepers would be honoured.

Bosnian Serb and Muslim military representatives on Wednesday reached a ceasefire agreement through the mediation of U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Commander for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Michael Rose. The ceasefire agreement is to go into effect at noon on Thursday. The two sides also agreed to place their artillery weapons under UNPROFOR control while the ceasefire agreement is in force.

Lord Owen said the NATO ultimatum for Serbs to pull back their artillery to lines 20 kilometers from the centre of Sarajevo or else air strikes against them would be launched had had a strong impact on the Serbs.

Owen said in a statement to BBC Radio he hoped that, at the next round of the peace talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina, opening on Thursday afternoon, the parties would reach agreement to appoint a U.N. administrator-designate for Sarajevo in preparation for the city's demilitarization.

'No Progress' Reported 10 Feb

LD1002150194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Report by correspondent Tihomir Vinkovic from Geneva]

[Text] There has been no progress in the negotiations on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At a plenary session presided over by peace mediators Owen and Stoltenberg, the Bosnian Serbs demanded that an international commission for establishing the crime at the Sarajevo marketplace should include both Serb and Muslim representatives. The Muslims refused, saying that the perpetrators, who they are convinced are the Serbs, could not take part in the investigation of the crime.

Owen and Stoltenberg are trying to salvage the negotiations. The mandate of the Geneva conference are peace negotiations, not individual cases. This is a task for UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], Lord Owen says. The basis for the Geneva negotiations on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a European Union plan. Croatia accepts this plan, Croatian Foreign Affairs Minister Mate Granic clearly said. Croatia, as well as a Croat delegation from Bosnia-Herzegovina, led by Mile Akmadzic, proposes international supervision of borders between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats also propose inspection of military formations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, through which Muslim allegations that the regular Army of the Republic of Croatia is fighting within the ranks of the Bosnian Croats would be denied.

The Croat delegation urges that an international commission should investigate last week's crime at the Sarajevo marketplace, but negotiations ought to be continued. The Croats also agree with the establishment of hot lines as a trust-building measure and the exchange of representatives of the three nations, as proposed by Owen and Stoltenberg. While I am reporting, there is a break in the plenary session, the resumption of which is expected soon.

Karadzic Walks Out of Talks

AU1002131394 Paris AFP in English 1312 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Text] Geneva, Feb 10 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic walked out of peace talks here Wednesday [as received], saying he refused to participate unless the responsibility for a mortar attack in Sarajevo that killed 68 was determined.

The routine meeting here came the day after NATO, reacting to Saturday's mortar attack, issued an ultimatum of February 21 for heavy artillery to be withdrawn from around Serb-besieged Sarajevo or it would launch air strikes. Karadzic had earlier threatened not to participate but then met with his Bosnian Moslem and Croat adversaries under the aegis of EC and UN mediators.

Government Survives No-Confidence Vote

AU0902152894 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1510 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] We switch to the National Assembly Hall, where the results of the no-confidence vote will be announced. National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov is giving the floor to Khristo Markov, who will announce the results:

[Markov] Today, 9 February, the National Assembly conducted a secret vote on the proposal to vote on confidence in the cabinet in connection with the failure of the cabinet to implement its duties regarding the citizens' security and the public law and order. The no-confidence vote was proposed on 28 January by the parliamentary faction of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS].

A commission composed by Khristo Markov, Ruslan Semerdzhiev, Mariela Miteva, and Kiril Zhelev announces the following results of the no-confidence vote:

Some 228 National Assembly members took part in the vote. Some 89 ballots were cast in support of the no-confidence vote. Some 135 ballots were cast against the no-confidence proposal. Three envelopes were found empty, and one contained more than one ballot.

On the basis of the voting results, and on Article 81, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Bulgarian Constitution, and Paragraph 4 of the additional instructions on the activity of the National Assembly, the no-confidence vote in the cabinet has been rejected.

Romanian Tanker Trucks Breaking Embargo

AU0802153094 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 5-6 Feb 94 p 2

[Report by Nikolay Zhukov]

[Text] A responsible customs officer has informed KONTINENT that the Ruse customs will be swamped with Romanian gasoline. At its meeting on Thursday 3 February the government hid the real reason for the temporary ban on importing vehicle gasoline, aviation fuel, and gas for lamps. The true reason is the immense import of fuels across the Danube Bridge.

Yesterday morning alone, the customs authorities detained 96 Romanian fuel tanker vehicles. According to a source in the Ministry of Trade, the border and customs authorities in Dragoman are no longer in a position to say no to the mafia, which is threatening their lives if they refuse to let the tankers through to Yugoslavia.

A police source declared that the state apparatus is not functioning, and only a complete ban can stop the flow of fuel to Belgrade.

Until the new excise duty tariff takes effect, the duty on liquid fuels is negligible, as compared with the huge profits of 250 to 300 percent that can be gained in embargo-stricken Yugoslavia.

At the moment the excise duty is 60 percent on A-96 and A-98 gasolines, and 50 percent on the A-86 and A-93 grades. A special police officer said that the Bulgarian mafia is stepping up its attempts to send fuel through the Dragoman border checkpoint because the Romanian and Hungarian mafias cannot wait.

The possibility cannot be excluded that the gasolines shipped through Ruse from Romania have actually been processed at the Neftokhim refinery in Burgas, because the Romanians insist on marketing their own petroleum abroad themselves.

The economic police are unable to check on the amounts of gasoline entering the country to establish whether it is destined for domestic consumption, whether it is stored in the huge tank parks of the state Petroleum Company, or whether it leaves the country again in Bulgarian railroad tankers.

Government's Approach to Sanctions Examined

AU0902182694 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 4 Feb 94 p 12

[Plamen Enchev commentary: "How To Exploit the Embargo"]

[Text] As was recently announced, an entire train loaded with oil barrels is supposed to have crossed the border with Serbia undisturbed. Yesterday, a company tried to export ammonium nitrate by declaring it as a detergent. Chemical experts, however, claim that the substance can be used as a raw material for making gunpowder.

The idea of the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro was conceived by the UN for the purpose of subjecting the remaining part of Yugoslavia to economic sanctions because of the war it is waging in Bosnia.

Only future historians can assess whether this is an appropriate action. The UN member countries, however, are obliged to observe the embargo as long as it is in force. Special organs in charge of supervising the observance of the Yugo-sanctions were established.

All these reflections lead to the legitimate question of how the different countries are observing the embargo. Has anyone heard from the Western mass media or read in their newspapers about Romania, Hungary, or Greece, for example, violating the UN sanction measures? No. However, the opposite is true in the case of our country. World-reknowned papers, magazines, and news agencies are openly declaring that something is happening at the Kalotina border checkpoint.

The other day REUTER filed a rather scary correspondent's report from Sofia about threats to which the

international teams in charge of supervising the observance of the sanctions by our country are allegedly subject. One of the observers even disclosed that, until recently, as many as 80 vans per day exported gasoline to Serbia without being disturbed by Bulgarian customs officials.

We officially declare to the world that our country is strictly observing the UN sanctions. Other neighbor countries of former Yugoslavia are claiming the same.

The truth is hardly likely to transpire in the near future. Some people are estimating its value in human lives, rather than in banknotes.

The question is whether anyone in our country is ready to declare that whoever violates the embargo shall be held responsible. In the opposite case, someone might think that busting the embargo is our state policy, which would not be so bad, if it was true. Nevertheless, we have some doubts about it.

Army's Finances, Repoliticization Viewed

AU0902103694 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 4 Feb 94 p 3

[Rayko Stoyanov commentary: "Dogan and Communists Are Liquidating the Bulgarian Army"]

[Text] The government's draft budget dooms the army to a slow death, the deputies of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] in the parliamentary National Security Commission think. They point out with concern that the 12 billion leva envisaged for this year will hardly cover the most urgent needs of the Bulgarian Army. "Rapidly growing inflation will eat into a significant part of this meager sum," a SDS deputy told DEMOKRATSIYA. "It must be remembered that at least 3 billion leva will go on last year's expenditure."

The situation is especially grave in the Air Force and the Navy. As Vice-Admiral Ventseslav Velkov, Navy commander, recently said, "70-80 percent of our warships are hopelessly obsolete." A high-ranking air force officer said with alarm that the the spare part situation for warplanes is desperate.

The situation of the ground troops is no better. Not only are there insufficient means for the army's equipment and training, but on top of this the budget envisages humiliatingly meager wages for the officers and sergeants. Battalion commanders will receive wages lower than those of the cleaning ladies in some private companies.

The Bulgarian Army's troubles do not end with the budget. New dismissals of capable officers are imminent, while at the same time people who implement the political orders of the present leadership are being promoted to command positions. Many officers think that the Army is again being deliberately politicized, even before the process of decommunization has ended. Reports confirm that the functions of the former State Security Third Administration, so much hated in the past by the officers, are being seized by Brigo Asparukhov's service. The Foreign Political Intelligence Service has already publicized its control over the General Staff and the civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

Deputy Explains Decision To Leave DPS

AU0802070294 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 7 Feb 94 p 2

[Interview with Medhmed Hodzha, deputy for the Rights and Freedoms Movement, DPS, by Mira Stefanova and Nataliya Vuchkova; place and date not given: "Mehmed Hodzha: DPS Is Full of Informants"]

[Text] [KONTINENT] Mr. Khodzha, why did you leave the DPS Parliamentary Group at this very moment?

[Hodzha] I was certainly not prompted by any emotional reasons. My doubts started as early as in late 1992. I was restrained by the concern about the DPS unity and about preventing the DPS constituents from learning about our disagreements, about the processes underway in our parliamentary group and in the Central Council. I very seriously objected to the developments in late 1992, when Mr. Stefan Savov was overthrown from the post of parliamentary chairman. I still do not understand why all this happened. The same applies to the subsequent events with the fall of Filip Dimitrov's government and the efforts to form a cabinet under Yordan Sokolov. As early as at that time I suspected my party's leadership of biased intentions. I had the feeling that all their actions were inspired by exterior forces, that it was not the wish of our constituents they were following, and that all these developments did not serve the people's interests. Naturally, the DPS Parliamentary Group and the Central Council found very convenient motives to explain the situation to their constituents, pretending that all their actions were aimed at solving the people's socioeconomic problems.

[KONTINENT] Mr. Hodzha, what makes you so sure that your misgivings and forebodings about such biased actions have already been confirmed?

[Hodzha] The DPS Central Council and the Parliamentary Group had decided that a bill or a draft resolution on disclosing personal police files should be moved as soon as possible, or in case another parliamentary group should submit such a proposal, our group would support it. Nevertheless, our leadership and its entourage did not support the draft resolution in question when it was submitted.

[KONTINENT] Do any former police informants exist among the DPS members?

[Hodzha] They definitely exist. A leading member of parliamentary group had the insolence and arrogance of proposing to the group that we should support the

nomination of Filip Bokov [from the Bulgarian Socialist Party] as head of the Bulgarian delegation to the European Parliamentary Assembly. This was a question of principle for us. It could have been our second great blunder. It was prevented with great efforts.

I am genuinely concerned about the negligent attitude of our DPS Parliamentary Group leadership, about its unwillingness to visit the areas of our constituents. In the community of Dzhebel, in part of the Krumovgrad, Ardino, and Kirkovo communities, even not one kg of the "Basma" tobacco variety has been purchased. last week a telegram was dispatched to all members of parliament from the Kurdzhali election district, with copies of the letter to the National Assembly Presidium and the Council of Ministers, asking for their presence at a meeting scheduled to take place on Saturday [29 February]. No one attended the meeting. What does it mean? It means a total lack of responsibility whatsoever toward the electorate. The excuse of one of our Parliamentary Group leaders was it would have been our duty to pass a bill on tobacco growing and processing and to force the government and the Bulgartabak Company to set a minimum purchasing price. However, much more than that is at stake. The existence of a whole economic branch and the survival of numerous human beings are at stake, as a matter of fact.

[KONTINENT] Would you return to parliament after the next elections as a deputy of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], for example?

[Hodzha] It depends on the local people, namely on the constituents. I am not the one to decide. If people, regardless of their ethnic origins, think that I would be eligible on the basis of my behavior and my actions, on the basis of my stand, if they become convinced that I am capable of defending their interests, I would not decline such a proposal. Naturally, I leave everything to them. I would not have the courage to appear before those people and try through mediators, or through hired persons, to persuade them that they should put my name on the list of candidates for the next elections.

[KONTINENT] Whose interests is the current DPS leadership serving in your view?

[Hodzha] They are serving alien interests, under all circumstances. I understand their dilemma. They are really under severe pressure, but in what case can someone be subject to pressure and blackmail? It can only be done with something stronger than a police file. Those people are trained [by Communists], and they would not get the permission of certain agencies outside the DPS to do something more for democracy. They are simply not free to do so.

If I had been a traitor and an informant, if I had really worked against my fellow villagers, I would not hold my present position, because no one would have elected me. However, there is something much more serious at stake. The DPS leadership is just following somebody's secret instructions. Such leaders cannot be free and they cannot possibly act in the interest of their constituents.

Cabinet Decides To Participate in 'Partnership'

LD0902164894 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] The cabinet is in session in Prague today. Jitka Kucerova phoned in this report.

[Kucerova] The cabinet has decided on the participation of the Czech Republic in the Partnership for Peace program. The so-called presentation document will be submitted by 31 March. The individual program of the Czech Republic in this project will be worked out on its basis.

The government also discussed the situation of national minorities. Vaclav Klaus said the following on this question: Our point of departure is no discrimination against minorities. The government, however, does not intend to set up any special institution to discuss these problems.

A draft amendment to the law on land communications was also adopted. In practice, this will mean the introduction of the long-discussed motorway tax. The preliminary day of introduction is 1 January 1995.

Klaus Views European Integration After Davos

AU0902164194 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 7 Feb 94 pp 1,3

[Article by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus: "Europe Viewed From the Perspective of the Meeting in Davos"]

[Text] One of the important topics on the agenda of the World Economic Forum in Davos was Europe—its current situation, its so-called "expansion," and its future. I must admit that I had to protest a little against the views regarding Europe's expansion, because I am convinced that Europe can never be expanded (or even made smaller) by anyone. Europe is Europe regardless of the kind of institutions established in it, and views about its expansion can only be contemplated in relation to individual European institutions or organizations. In a panel discussion involving the Belgian, Danish, Finnish, and Czech prime ministers, it became obvious that this difference is very important and that we are the ones who always point it out. Finnish Prime Minister Aho played into my hands by quoting the famous Finnish composer Sibelius, thus enabling me to reply that Sibelius was not only a Finnish composer, but also—undoubtedly—a European one, without being recognized as such by some European institutions. The topic of many discussions was the future of Europe and its position in the world.

Our experience tells us that the success (or failure) of Europe—and, in fact, of all of us—does not so much depend on the existence, scope, and activities of multilateral European institutions, but that it depends far more on the type and structure of the political, social, and economic system that exists in European countries. We know very well that the reason for our own failure to keep pace with Western Europe and our rather unhappy life during the past four decades was not the existence of an institution like the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, but the existence of the communist regime. The symmetric opposite also applies: The success of Western Europe did not depend on European Community institutions, but on a free society, private ownership, and a free market. This was not only valid in the past, it is also valid for today and tomorrow.

It is being decided right now whether Eastern Europe will uphold such a system or whether it will allow it to degenerate into a new form of collectivism endorsed under the banner of this or that old- new salvation-bringing "ism." The success of Europe depends on the extent of individual freedom; the extent of the free market and trade; the ability to get rid of unnecessary state interference in people's lives and their economic activities; curbing bureaucratic manipulation with everyone and everything; our determination and courage to limit the influence of the powerful and the social well being of lobby groups; and our ability to put in order the basic economic attributes, especially our handling of the reward we get for them.

In this context and under these circumstances, it is necessary to specify carefully the conditions for the possible favorable impact of multilateral European institutions on our future. I am concerned that the careful formulation of these conditions is being forgotten due to the simplified and a priori accepted argument that, without a united Europe, we will be "small," "weak," and "unable to stand up to competition" with the world's other regions. The favorable impact of these institutions, however, depends on the following:

1. Whether these pan-European institutions are greater advocates of the free market and free trade and greater opponents of state interventionism, bureaucracy, and lobbying than individual European states;

2. Whether the institutionalized, organized integration of Europe produces "bulk savings," or whether the rewards from the size of the regions would be higher than the losses associated with the functioning of too-widespread organizations;

3. Whether the idea of a unified, institutionally united Europe is in the real interests of Europe's citizens and not just in the interests of European politicians of a particular ideological persuasion, as is the case at the moment.

Patiently seeking (and empirically verifying) the answers to these questions has nothing whatsoever to do with nationalism (or internationalism), egoism (or altruism), or not seeing further than one's own nose (or adopting a broader view and perspective) as is often cast up—in an oversimplified manner—on certain people in our country and abroad.

The Czech Republic proceeds from the hypothesis that the Czech lands were always part of Europe and,

therefore, that they do not want to be deprived of all the advantages stemming from membership in European institutions. I firmly believe that we have already crossed the Rubicon dividing the two totally different social systems, that we deserve to be taken seriously, and that we are prepared for further steps toward European integration. If I say integration, it is because I do not want to say unification or association, which are altogether different processes.

We want to be an "equal partner" that does not just want to get or acquire something, we are also prepared to give. We know we have to resolve our problems ourselves and, therefore, we are not asking anyone to resolve them for us. We believe that the current form of the European integration process is not the final one, and we would like to participate in the never-ending process of seeking the most ideal form for it. We realize that our communist past enables us to see some things more clearly than the countries of Western Europe, which did not have this past. This was a great blessing for them, but it is our duty to constantly point out some of the stumbling blocks. We believe that we will be listened to.

Back Pain Forces Moravcik To Cancel Visits

LD0902173094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik did not take part in the signing of the treaty on Slovakia joining the Partnership for Peace program in Brussels today for health reasons. In an interview with TA SR, the minister indicated that he is undergoing an intensive course of treatment for back pain, and because of this he has also postponed a planned visit to Bulgaria.

Germany's Ruehe Visits, Comments on NATO

LD0902211394 Berlin DDP/ADN in German 1958 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] Prague (DDP/ADN)—Defense Minister Volker Ruehe sees "certain possibilities" that Slovakia could accede to NATO by the end of the century. Ruehe said at the conclusion of a two-day visit to Bratislava (Pressburg) that this is, however, dependent on international developments. The German delegation has gained the impression that Slovakia is preparing for membership of western structures in all areas.

In Bratislava, Ruehe met President Kovac, Prime Minister Meciar, Assembly Speaker Gasparovic, Foreign Minister Moravcik, and his counterpart Andrejcak. An agreement on cooperation in the military field was signed during the visit. Ruehe said that he sees the preconditions for close, positive cooperation between Germany and Slovakia.

Democratic Party's Cech Also Killed in Crash

AU1002111394 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 8 Feb 94 p 1

[TA SR report: "V. Cech Was Also Killed"]

[Text] Bratislava—We carried a report yesterday on the car accident and death of Democratic Party Chairman Anton Duris. We received a more detailed agency report after our news deadline. It says that the party's deputy chairman, Vladimir Cech, who was probably driving the car, was also killed in the accident not far from Plesivec.

V. Cech died on his 44th birthday.

Poll Reveals Party Preferences; HZDS Leads

AU1002102194 Bratislava SME in Slovak 5 Feb 94 p 1

[TA SR report: "Is the Slovak National Party Sinking?"]

[Text] According to the FOCUS (Center for Social and Marketing Analysis) agency, in reply to a question on which parties they would vote for if parliamentary elections were held this weekend, respondents answered as follows: Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] (17.2 percent); Party of the Democratic Left (11.4 percent); Christian Democratic Movement (7.1 percent); and Slovak Green Party (5.0 percent).

The Slovak National Party (3.8 percent) would come sixth and the Alliance of Democrats of Slovakia, the so-called Knazkoites, would come eighth (2.3 percent). Only 0.4 percent of citizens in Slovakia would vote for the Hungarian Civic Party. More than 20 percent of respondents would not take part in the elections and almost 11 percent had not yet made a decision.

Jeszenszky Briefs Assembly on Belgrade Visit

LD0902183994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Today the Hungarian National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee heard Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky's report on his visit in Belgrade on 27 January. He confirmed once again that Hungary is not going to initiate the lifting of the UN embargo. Peter Gyuricza reports from the Committee's meeting.

[Gyuricza] Events of the following months will prove whether changes in Belgrade politics—which also made possible Foreign Minister Jeszenszky's visit—have indeed taken place. The foreign minister said that these changes include the diminishing of psychological pressure on ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina, reducing extremist manifestations, easing the tone of the Belgrade press, and decreasing the frequency of call-ups.

Geza Jeszenszky favorably viewed the fact that negotiations are under way between the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina and the Serbian Government with regard to autonomy and its institutions. Geza Jeszenszky said that Hungary will not initiate lifting the UN Security Council embargo. At the same time, however, as a sovereign state guided by its national interests, it may believe that the time has come to hold talks about this with its partners and allies, especially since no way out can be seen. [passage omitted] Hungary is observing the UN Security Council resolution, stressed Geza Jeszenszky. [passage omitted]

Jeszenszky Views Relations With Serbia, NATO

AU0902144594 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Feb 94 p 3

[Matthias Rueb report: "The Central European States Will Be Successful Together or Fail Together"]

[Text] Budapest, 8 February—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky is trying to smooth down the waves that were caused by his official visit to Belgrade from 27 to 29 January this year. There, Jeszenszky had met, among others, "Yugoslav" Foreign Minister Jovanovic, Serbian President Milosevic, and representatives of the opposition parties. Agoston, chairman of the Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMDK), had participated in the talks with Milosevic and Jeszenszky. In an interview with this newspaper before his departure to Brussels, where he signed the "Partnership for Peace" agreement with NATO on Tuesday, Jeszenszky expressed his surprise at the light in which his meeting with the political leaders of the southern neighboring country is now being presented. It is not true that Hungary agreed with Serbia on main points. The Hungarian foreign minister was particularly furious about a WASHINGTON POST report that the attempt at the normalization of Serbian-Hungarian relations that had been made by Budapest is endangering the observation of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations against Serbia and Montenegro.

Jeszenszky affirmed Budapest's point of view, which had already been stated in Belgrade, that Hungary is supporting the lifting of the sanctions if "Yugoslavia" succeeds in again winning the favor of the community of states by its actions. By that time, which is hopefully not too far off, Hungary will, of course, fulfill its commitments toward the United Nations and other international organizations. Hungary has always strictly watched over the observation of the sanctions at its borders, he said. (In fact, representatives of the commissions of the European Union (EU) for the observation of the embargo have always praised the cooperation with the Hungarian authorities.) Although his country suffered an economic damage of about 2.5 billion German marks because of the sanctions, Hungary will stick to the exact controls at the checkpoints with Serbia. However, it is equally evident that Hungary must not wait unprepared for the lifting of the sanctions, he said. Jeszenszky protested against the assumption that Hungary might have promised the government in Belgrade that the sanctions will be loosened in exchange for granting limited autonomy to the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, which belongs to Serbia. "Such a deal does not exist," Jeszenszky said.

He carefully chose the date of his visit to Belgrade because, in the weeks before, a turnabout of the government in Belgrade had been perceptible—that is, regarding the 400,000 Hungarians in Vojvodina, as well as the demands of the community of states. Hungary is supporting the Kinkel-Juppe plan of the European Union, which provides for the gradual loosening of the sanctions in exchange for concessions of the Serbs in the peace negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nobody will be able to reproach his country for striving for cooperation with Serbia, for example, in the combating of crime, and for seeking a dialogue with Serbian authorities, so that the passage of Hungarian ships on the Danube across Serbia is no longer impeded by illegal blockades by Serbian nationalists, he said. The Hungarian foreign minister is aware that only time will show whether the Serbian president's good words will also be followed by action. Not only since the latest massacre in Sarajevo has he viewed the relations with Serbia with skepticism and refrained from any naive hopes, he said.

Hungary unreservedly accepts NATO's offer of a Partnership for Peace. In the Hungarian foreign minister's opinion, this concept opens up two opportunities: On the one hand, if offers Russia the opportunity to get closer to NATO, while, on the other, it makes allowance for the fact that Russia's domestic policy might develop in a wrong direction. Central Europe rightly attaches central importance to the Partnership for Peace; it is not a policy of weakness that shows too much consideration for Russia. Apparently, the conviction that one cannot be successful in pushing through democracy and the market economy in Russia, without having previously pushed

through democracy and the market economy in Central Europe is shared in Brussels, he said. The Hungarian foreign minister advocates the theory that democracy and the market economy are gradually advancing from the West to the East. Jeszenszky does not believe that NATO will demand from Hungary that its military expenditure of currently 2 percent of its gross national product has to be increased soon to 4 to 5 percent, which is usual in the NATO states. "The Partnership for Peace is not a program that involves high costs, but it can contribute to the modernization and restructuring of the armed forces of the Central European states with a relatively small financial expenditure," Jeszenszky said.

Regarding Hungary's integration into the European Union, it has meanwhile been shown that the opinion voiced, for example, by Chancellor Kohl in 1990, that is, that Hungary could become a full member in five to six years, was due to the generally hopeful mood at that time. Today one has to see that full EU membership—the association agreement with Hungary came into force on 2 February this year—has to be expected to take a longer time, approximately until the end of this century. In view of the security risks in Central Europe, it is a logical development that the West has above all accelerated security policy integration. Therefore, it is likely that it will be easier for Hungary and its Central European partners to be admitted to NATO and the Western European Union than to the European Union.

For Jeszenszky, Hungary and Poland have been the driving forces of the states of the so-called Visegrad Group right from the beginning. The Hungarian foreign minister deplored that the Czech Republic and Slovakia are pursuing cooperation with their Visegrad partners, Poland and Hungary, with only little enthusiasm. "Central Europe will be jointly successful or jointly fail," Jeszenszky said. Those in Prague who believe that a special road to NATO or the European Union can be taken is wrong. Jeszenszky advocated the revival of cooperation both in the Visegrad Group and the Central European Initiative [CEI]. The CEI, to which Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina belong today, developed from a small alliance of Central European states, the so-called Pentagonal. For the Hungarian foreign minister it was a disappointment to see the former Czechoslovakia increasingly withdraw from the CEI after rather enthusiastic cooperation at the beginning. Because of the war in the former Yugoslavia and the unstable situation in Italy, the CEI had to limit itself to modest objectives and little significant statements for the time being, he said. Nevertheless, Jeszenszky also hopes for the revival of the CEI, because all member states should be interested in increased economic exchange, all the more so after peace in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This also offers the chance of closer political cooperation, Jeszenszky concluded.

Hungary, Ukraine To Cooperate in 'Partnership'

LD0802150894 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Text] Hungary and Ukraine will cooperate in the Partnership for Peace program. The defense ministers of the two countries have agreed on this at their meeting in Budapest.

Army General Vitaliy Hryhororovich Radetskyy, speaking at a press briefing, said that they also discussed regional cooperation from which they do not want to exclude Russia. They also decided that a committee of experts would be set up to examine the possibility of military industrial cooperation. Hungary is interested primarily in obtaining parts for aircraft, tanks, and armored combat vehicles.

Guidelines for Television Campaigning Published

AU0902152794 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 9 Feb 94 pp 1, 4

["L.G."-initialed report: "Chairman's Orders on Program Making—The Campaign on the Television"]

[Text] On 8 February, in a chairman's order, Gabor Nahlik, Hungarian Television's deputy chairman who has the powers of chairman, published the guidelines on program-making which, based on the election code of ethics, determine public service television programming during the election campaign.

Accordingly, the News, The Week, and the Daybreak [Napkelte] programs will follow the events of the campaign in the first period of the election campaign, strictly adhering to the principles of proportionality and impartiality. In this period, the television will not broadcast paid election advertisements.

In the campaign period in the stricter sense of the word, the television will broadcast campaign programs by introducing the parties and their candidates that have a national list.

It will provide an opportunity for the parties to contrast their views and ideas twice a week in 60-minute discussion programs. The leaders on party lists will participate in the last, 90-minute discussion forum to be held two days before the elections.

During the four-week campaign period, all parties that are on national lists can appear on television with a film edited by themselves and at their own costs, in the order drawn in front of a public notary. Every party will have two chances to appear, first with a five-minute film, then with a 10-minute one. To prepare these programs, the parties will be able to use Hungarian Television's film archives for a charge, but they can only use material made on them and not other parties. In the actual campaign period, all parties can have altogether one minute per day advertising time on the two channels together. The propaganda films will be made at the cost

of the parties and the television will broadcast these for 10 percent of the usual charge. The broadcasting time of these advertising films will be decided by a draw. The same applies to the period between the two rounds of the elections.

In accordance with the election code of ethics, parties that set up lists have to be shown in news programs on the election events under identical conditions, and the election reports have to be done in proportion to their nominations. The duty of the election programs is to explain the electoral law in an understandable way, and to assert that participation in the elections is a moral and political obligation for all citizens. To inform the public, constitutional lawyers and politicians will explain the electoral system, its advantages as opposed to other systems, and the procedure of the elections. According to the chairman's orders, to mobilize the public and to ensure the highest possible participation, these programs will have to show the election experiences of western countries, the electoral activities of Hungarians living in the West, and well-known Hungarian intellectuals will have to speak about this issue. The views of the committee that is defined in the elections code of ethics will have to be asked on disputed or unclear issues. These orders will come into force from the date of their publication, namely 4 February 1994.

PSL-SLD Leaders Negotiate, Reach Compromise

WS0902104594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Feb 94 pp 1-2

[Report by E.Cz., E.K., and Ma.S.: "PSL-SLD Negotiations; Evening Compromise"]

[Text] The leaders of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] reached a compromise yesterday a few minutes before 2300; by doing so, they put an and to the crisis which started 11 days ago.

In line with the joint communique, both parties want to maintain the coalition until the elections in four years' time. The coalition members agreed to unanimously support the budget bill submitted by the government. They expressed very positive opinions on the "knowledge, competence, and activeness of Marek Borowski." The coalition agreement, as both sides unanimously stress, is still binding. Therefore, the candidate for the vacant post of the finance minister will be proposed by SLD. Borowski already knows his name, but, as he said, he cannot reveal it yet.

Hours Before

On Tuesday [8 February] Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak irrevocably accepted the resignation of Marek Borowski, deputy prime minister and finance minister. The president signed the prime minister's motion concerning his recall. The coalition talks, which started in the evening in the hotel of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM] at Parkowa Street, were preceded by an hour-long meeting between Kwasniewski and Pawlak, which had not been the first one in the past two days. The prime minister's Press Secretary Ewa Wachowicz told the journalists, who had come to the URM seat in quite a large number, that there would be no comments either before or immediately after the meeting.

The Council of Ministers, which held a session on that day, despite earlier declarations, did not issue its opinions on the Sejm committees' amendments to the budget bill (they were presented by Minister Borowski, who had already handed in his resignation). The government members met later in the Constitutional composition (only the prime minister and ministers) in order to discuss the situation that had developed after Marek Borowski's resignation. As we learned from one of the participants of this sitting, the meeting was held so that ministers would not find out about the events concerning the government from the mass media.

The Left Miscalculated

"The decision concerning the recall of Minister Marek Borowski was not made because I wanted this—it was made because of the declaration of the interested parties," said Prime Minister Pawlak in Radio "Zet." The prime minister believes that Borowski's decision to submit his resignation was unnecessary.

The response of SLD politicians to the prime minister's decision, or rather, its lack, suggests that they were taken aback by it.

According to PSL members, Aleksander Kwasniewski and his cooperators made a second attempt to force PSL to make a decision that is favorable. They claim that the first attempt was when the composition of the cabinet was being negotiated. They say that the first list submitted in the Belvedere was fully agreed with SLD. SLD queried it and renegotiated the filling of the posts in the key economic ministries, which, according to the peasants, was a deliberate propaganda ploy of SLD. Pawlak, who was obliged to meet the deadlines set by the Constitution, had to agree to these SLD proposals. In PSL circles one can hear opinions that the issue of Borowski was a similar ploy.

According to unofficial information, which was confirmed by several credible sources, Deputy Prime Minister Borowski knew earlier about the scheduled recall of his deputy; he consented to it, but kept delaying the decision to sign off on it. Thus, it was Pawlak who did it. The violent response of SLD was received by PSL as another propaganda trick, which was once again supposed to help SLD gain greater influence in the government as well as to limit the role of Prime Minister Pawlak and Minister Strak: Such a version of the developments seems to be borne out by unofficial statements of SLD politicians, who claim that Marek Borowski's resignation was a tactical ploy. It was supposed to force PSL to hold talks on the functioning of the government, economic policy, cadre policy, information policy, and the cooperation within the coalition—that is, all the controversial issues. SLD accuses the prime minister of steering the work of the government rather inefficiently; it also points out that Minister Strak, when making decisions concerning the cadres in the state administration, favors his party colleagues.

Prime Minister Pawlak, backed by his party, did not yield in this conflict. The peasants emphasize that they would not allow anyone to place them in a second position, just as it was in the time of the Polish People's Republic. For the time being SLD lost, or rather, it was outmaneuvered. Will it receive anything in return for Borowski's recall? There were speculations that it would be the recall of Michal Strak. According to credible sources, the prime minister did not agree to that.

What Does the SLD Want?

When the conflict between the prime minister and Minister Borowski came to the surface, SLD politicians started to say increasingly louder that the government head should sign as soon as possible appointments of the coalition's representatives in the presidential ministries, that is, in the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. SLD politicians unofficially confirm that they want to

force Pawlak to make such a decision. It would be a bargaining chip for Kwasniewski's party over the "issue of Kawalec."

Despite the efforts of SLD leaders, the prime minister has so far been unable to make a decision on "strengthening the coalition" in the presidential ministries.

SLD also wants a stronger position of the Presidium of the Government. It consists of the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers. It is an extra-constitutional body. In line with the SLD proposal, it would be the presidium, not only the prime minister, that would steer the work of the cabinet.

To their surprise, journalists were admitted to the URM premises, where, in line with earlier official information, the coalition talks were supposed to be held. Fifteen minutes after the announced time when the talks were supposed to begin, the journalists were addressed by Ewa Wachowicz, who said that the talks had already begun, but she was not authorized to tell them where the meeting was being held. When asked bluntly whether the talks were being held at Parkowa Street, she replied:

"I do not confirm this, but I do not deny it, either."

Therefore, most of the journalists went to the hotel at Parkowa Street. Twenty minutes later, those few who decided to stay in URM saw the prime minister with two bodyguards walk toward his office.

"We have only just started," he told the surprised journalists. The actual coalition talks began at Parkowa Street at approximately 2000 [1900 GMT].

SLD Spokesman Comments

WS0902144594 Warsaw Radio ESKA in Polish 0815 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Interview with Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, press spokesman for the Democratic Left Alliance, by Maria Bninska at the Radio ESKA studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of ESKA" program—live]

[Text] [Bninska] Good morning to you.

[Siemiatkowski] Good morning to you, too.

[Bninska] Yesterday's talks ended quite late at night—in any event, we, journalists, did not leave the hotel at Parkowa Street until after 2300. Did you, the participants of the talks, have any further talks after that?

[Siemiatkowski] Yes, we did, but it was a purely social kind of meeting.

[Bninska] But was anything more decided during that social meeting than what we managed to find out?

[Siemiatkowski] No, especially given that the meeting practically included only members of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. It was a meeting whose practical purpose was to recap what happened in recent days and also to think what the next moves should be, but this time they will be made by SLD.

[Bninska] Today's newspapers report that the conflict between SLD and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] has been overcome. Has it really been overcome, or is it just a temporary calm and another story will break soon?

[Siemiatkowski] I mean, I would like to make a subtle protest here against using the term conflict between SLD and PSL. We do not hide the fact that it was indeed a case of a crisis in mutual relations between the coalition partners, but this crisis was not caused by [word indistinct] issues, I mean by personal issues—that is the way it looked in the beginning. It was in essence a grievance of the SLD part of the coalition against the part represented by the prime minister, over some irregularities in the functioning of the Council of Ministers. Everything that was caused by Mr. Kawalec's dismissal was a catalyst for some negative phenomena which took place in the functioning of the Council of Ministers.

[Bninska] Aleksander Kwasniewski used stronger terms when talking about that—he said Prime Minister Pawlak fails to observe the coalition agreement.

[Siemiatkowski] In this particular case—and also in some others which we also made public—it was a case of nonobservance of some binding provisions on the part of Mr. Waldemar Pawlak—these provisions boiled down to the need to consult the deputy prime ministers concerned and in the presence of the chairmen of the fractions, over the most important strategic and political decisions, including personnel decisions. In the case of Mr. Kawalec—and also in other cases, for instance appointing local governors [wojewodowie]—this particular provision of the coalition agreement was not observed and that is why it was necessary to have another discussion.

[Bninska] Yesterday's communique—which is quite laconic—says that the coalition agreement continues to be binding and that both sides will observe it. What kinds of guarantees did you [SLD activists] receive that Prime Minister Pawlak will observe particularly that provision, when you look ahead a month, two, or three months down the road?

[Siemiatkowski] The communique is not so laconic at all. It contains two very important issues—it first of all confirms that there is a will on both sides to keep the PSL-SLD coalition in existence ....

[Bninska, interrupting] And what is more, it is to continue for as long as four years.

[Siemiatkowski] Yes, for four years, so practically speaking all the speculations have been cut off at this point—I mean the speculations which emerged in the meantime, concerning a possible reversal of alliances. Some have even expressed their willingness to participate in such alliances—let me remind you of the funny case of Mr. Krol or Mr. Moczulski [of the Confederation

for an Independent Poland] among others, who have even called a news conference, and felt they were almost inside the coalition, but then it turned out nobody invited them there in the first place. That is the first issue, and the other issue which SLD felt very strongly about, is that PSL—through those who signed the communique, including the prime minister himself—accepts the principle of a unanimous support of the budget draft which had been presented by the government. That is because we felt at one point—this was our feeling at the time—that there is a government of Mr. Waldemar Pawlak and a budget by Minister Borowski. We took the position from the very beginning that it is a budget of Waldemar Pawlak's government. The budget was designed according to some criteria which allow for a chance for economic growth and for maintaining positive economic trends.

[Bninska] So my understanding is that there will be no more cases such as what happened during a session by a Sejm commission where a minister for this government—I mean the foreign economic cooperation minister, Mr. Leslaw Podkanski who is at the same time a Sejm deputy—demanded another trillion zlotys for something, and when asked by Mr. Marek Borowski whether he made the demand as a minister or as a Sejm deputy, he said: This time, I am doing this as a Sejm deputy.

[Siemiatkowski] There will be no cases like this. We should not have events like the prime minister's speech at the Zeran automobile factory where he distanced himself from some price rises—this made it look as if the rises were just Minister Borowski's responsibility and as if they had not been agreed upon by the entire Council of Ministers—I mean the price rises with regard to energy carriers. We should not have very many other examples of such incidents which basically undermined the coherency of the cabinet's economic policies.

[Bninska] All right, the communique also states that the posts of both deputy prime minister and the finance minister, will remain within SLD's range of powers. There are rumors that perhaps it will not be just one person occupying the two posts, like it was in the case of Minister Borowski. The first question is: Who will be the finance minister? The second question is: Who will be the deputy prime minister?

[Siemiatkowski] Of course, I have not been authorized to give names at this stage. There are many candidates. The issue requires very deep deliberation on SLD's part. The person to occupy the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister—I think this is what you mean ....

[Bninska, interrupting] So this will be just one person who will be in charge of both posts?

[Siemiatkowski] Of course, because only the kind of positioning of the finance minister which also places him as the chairman of the Council of Ministers' Economic Committee, creates an opportunity for him to conduct a coherent economic policy and to influence measures taken by the individual ministers responsible for the economy. I am returning here to the conditions set by Minister Borowski before the prime minister at one point—where there was a statement [word indistinct] that if the deputy prime minister for economic affairs is to be efficient, then his powers should be clearly defined and he also must enjoy autonomy in what he does. We will return to that condition in our talks with PSL.

[Bninska] These conditions were not approved. What will happen to them next?

[Siemiatkowski] These were not conditions, these were postulates for improving the activity of the Council of Ministers ....

[Bninska, interrupting] But the prime minister refused to agree to them.

[Siemiatkowski] I think that yesterday's talks—and also subsequent talks ahead of us, this time we will discuss a specific person who will take up the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister—will force both us and PSL to initiate talks again on the topic of improving the Council of Ministers' functioning, on defining the finance minister's powers in a clear manner, and also on increasing discipline in the course of statements and activities undertaken by the individual ministers who on many occasions—you [addressing Bninska] cited an example yourself—kind of torpedoed the finance minister's measures.

[Bninska] Will the person who will take up both posts be very closely associated with SLD? Or will he be just a well-wisher?

[Siemiatkowski] Ladies and Gentlemen, Minister Borowski established such high standards through his skills and competence, that it will be very hard for us to find a person who would meet the criteria which are also required for someone to fulfill the post of finance minister [word indistinct]

[Bninska, interrupting] So there is just one Borowski within SLD?

[Siemiatkowski] Ladies and Gentlemen, for a few years now we have gotten used to Mr. Marek Borowski being the person responsible for economic policies within SLD—and before that, in the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, when we were still in the opposition when he was charged with the concept of opposition economic policies—we associated our plans and ideas with him, and in a word—most of us were attached to him but as we all know, life does not tolerate a vacuum and there are no irreplaceable people. In this situation, we must find someone who will be able to continue in a competent manner with the policies initiated by Mr. Marek Borowski. That person also has to be able to implement the policy in close contact with Mr. Marek Borowski, especially since he will also be co-responsible as a Sejm deputy and he will have an impact on the

government's economic policies since he is coming back to the [Sejm] Budget Commission where he will work.

[Bninska] You came to a compromise with PSL yesterday. If my understanding is correct, a compromise is based on giving something up in return for gaining something else. What did SLD have to give up?

[Siemiatkowski] I think we achieved a great deal by forcing the prime minister and also our coalition partners from PSL to think through the situation that emerged, we forced them to discuss again the terms of the coalition agreement, and we also forced them to publicly confirm that there is no alternative to the PSL-SLD coalition.

[Bninska] But you must have given up something.

[Siemiatkowski] We gave up Marek Borowski. That is a high price to pay.

[Bninska] Did you also give up demands for a resignation by the chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM] Michal Strak?

[Siemiatkowski] We have never made this kind of postulate. The only postulate we did make was to have a reorganization of work done by URM, and we also expressed criticism with regard to URM's personnel policies, in particular with regard to the government's territorial administration [words indistinct]

[Bninska] And what did the prime minister give up during yesterday's talks? After all, he also must have given up something.

[Siemiatkowski] I think he gave up the kinds of statements which were made even during the television newscast the day before yesterday—I mean the kinds of statements were he distanced himself from Minister Borowski's economic policies which were also supported by SLD—that was an economic policy based on the concept of development, but one which also took the economic realities into account and which does not create a danger of Poland slipping into economic rowdiness, a return of inflation, or announcing slogans which are very nice to hear but which are economically meaningless.

[Bninska] And what did SLD gain?

[Siemiatkowski, hesitating] What we gained was a confirmation of the will for the SLD-PSL coalition to exist. It seems that is ....

[Bninska, interrupting] And what did PSL gain?

[Siemiatkowski, hesitating] Nobody needed the conflict, and we made that clear to our PSL colleagues and partners. It was a game with a negative balance—nobody gained and everybody lost. We all lost in the eyes of part of the public opinion which at one point had a right to ask the question of whether the coalition agreement and the election promises are really being implemented in a responsible manner, and also whether the significant portion of our society did the right thing by voting PSL and SLD on 19 September. We wanted to make that clear to our partners, as well—namely that the real stakes in the game are much higher: Public trust, the country's fate, and the fact that somebody had put faith in us and we must act accordingly. In that context, individual ambitions by parties or people are a secondary issue. I think we were probably successful in conveying that to our PSL colleagues and to the prime minister during yesterday's talks.

[Bninska] Has President Lech Walesa finally signed Deputy Prime Minister Borowski's resignation?

[Siemiatkowski] He affirmed during yesterday's newscast that he had signed it.

[Bninska] During the same newscast, the president also said that the time has come for the parliament to deal with enacting legislation and that the time has come for presidential rules. What does SLD say to that?

[Siemiatkowski] The president's involvement in the last stage of the coalition crisis only proves that nobody gained anything from the crisis, and if there was anybody who could gain, it was the president who immediately used the opportunity to have his contribution and to point to the crisis in the mutual relations within the coalition and also to imperfect constitutional provisions, and in that regard he discussed again his concept of a strong presidency. That is just proof that our crisis was being watched very closely. We also made it clear to our coalition partners that among our mutual obligations toward the voters, there is an obligation to speak in favor of a constitutional authority based on a cabinet-parliamentary system. It would be hard for anyone of us to explain that we are in favor of presidential rules. I think the president unnecessarily made a hurried gesture in the sense of making statements that could in a way strengthen his position.

[Bninska] But the president has disliked this government from the beginning, and he did not even try to hide it. Most of all, he has disliked SLD. Is SLD afraid that the president could vigorously try to create presidential rules even before his term is over?

[Siemiatkowski] The president is a very skillful politician, and so he is applying the very old principle of: Divide and rule. He points to some parts of the coalition as better than others. The most important thing is that we do not let him divide us, I mean PSL and SLD. I can see no possibility of any special increase in presidential powers before his term is over. He is in power based on the Small Constitution and until the constitution proper is enacted, all in all his powers are limited since he has to share his powers with the executive branch—that is with the government—and also with the legislative branch, that is the parliament. There is a system of different forces in effect which mutually control one another, and I think the system proves its validity during crisis situations which erupt now and then. The president has

always won when he was an umpire, but in this case he wanted to go beyond the role and be a party, in a way. Becoming a party to conflicts has always been bad for the presidential post.

[Bninska] You said PSL and SLD cannot allow having anyone create divisions between them. What about divisions within both of them? As recently as the day before yesterday, the prime minister quote, played, unquote, this whole conflict, with the aim—among others—of creating a split within SLD and having the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement [OPZZ] sever its connections with SLD.

[Siemiatkowski] An attempt like this was indeed undertaken. We also mentioned that issue to the prime minister during yesterday's talks and I think ....

[Bninska, interrupting] And what did he say?

[Siemiatkowski] An official statement signed by OPZZ Deputy Chairman Martyniuk was a lot of food for thought for the prime minister—Martyniuk in a way distanced himself from assessments which were contained in the prime minister's television appearance. Martyniuk informed that OPZZ is not a group which would be interested in creating political destabilization in the country and that the trade union—while understanding the supreme interests—is willing to support the budget, and that is also a very important statement which means that you just cannot make irresponsible statements like this [by Pawlak] and play games with social moods and with moods of various interest groups.

[Bninska] What are the guarantees of yesterday's agreement's observance in practice? Apart from the joint communique, SLD continues to be practically deprived of an impact on what happens in URM, which means no impact on the day-to-day decisionmaking by the government. There are no SLD men in URM so you have no guarantees that the prime minister will observe the agreement. What did he tell SLD?

[Siemiatkowski] Ladies and Gentlemen, we are in favor of a thesis which says that politics conducted without the right principles, must backfire sooner or later. One of the principles in politics is keeping promises and obligations. Our view is that the signatures themselves which were placed under the communique must be proof enough of the goodwill by those who signed the communique. Those who placed these signatures must also be aware that the signature means something more than just the ink.

[Bninska] But at the very beginning of the conflict SLD expressed very harsh views on the prime minister and on the whole case. Day by day, the tone of the statements became less radical, until yesterday's shake-hands by Aleksander Kwasniewski and Waldemar Pawlak. How did you calculate this? Why was decreasing the tensions worth it for you?

[Siemiatkowski] It was not a calculation. All we did was to come to a conclusion at some point that we will no longer make the conflict more radical.

[Bninska] Why is that?

[Siemiatkowski] Because of the supreme interest in leading to a stabilization of Poland's political situation—we were successful in achieving that, thanks to the establishment of the majority coalition which has such a huge support in the Sejm. The coalition has very important tasks before it, namely to solve problems resulting from the necessity of continuing with the reforms of our economy and of making permanent the democratic processes which are occurring in Poland, or which have been occurring for four years now. That is the supreme issue, and all the other issues are secondary. That is why we were even willing to give up our own ambitions, if we could only gain [words indistinct]

[Bninska, interrupting] If you could only remain in the governing coalition?

[Siemiatkowski] No, remaining in the governing coalition at any cost was not the issue. The issue was about being in a coalition which has the chances to implement a policy which is in accordance with the interests of those people who voted for SLD. I can assure you that if there comes a time when we reach the calculated conclusion that SLD's continued presence in any kind of association with the authorities, or in a coalition, is not in accordance with the interests of those who had voted for us and with the interests of the entire society—in that case we will not insist on keeping the posts which our colleagues currently occupy. And if we come to the conclusion that we can do more for our voters while being in the opposition, then we will switch to the opposition. But as of today, our view is that there is both a chance and a real possibility of implementing our election program while being in a governing coalition. Only when you are in power, do you have implementation instruments necessary for implementing an election program.

[Bninska] Thank you very much for the conversation.

[Siemiatkowski] Thank you.

Opposition Leader Comments

LD0902153194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1211 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] Warsaw, 9 Feb—While commenting on the outcome of yesterday's coalition talks, Leszek Moczulski, KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] leader, told PAP: "Both sides are not yet mature enough to part. The coalition has been pasted together." For Moczulski it is only a formal blurring of the conflict and the next one may take place as early as in four weeks' time.

The KPN leader is of the opinion that none of the concrete matters have been resolved. It has not been explained, for example, what will be the government attitude towards privatization; whether it will be like

that of Bogdan Pek, head of the ownership transformation commission, or that of Wieslaw Kaczmarek, minister for ownership transformations. The matter of the Ministry of Finance has not been resolved, Moczulski claims, except for agreeing that the ministerial post still belongs to the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance].

Moczulski asks, does it mean agreement for, for example, Mr Sekula [head of the Main Customs Office] becoming the minister? According to him the SLD has no suitable candidates for the post, perhaps with the exception of professor Jozef Kaleta who, as Moczulski said, has different economic views.

Moczulski described the results of Tuesday's talks as an avoidance of important issues and an agreement that the existence of the coalition is in the interest of both sides.

Adviser Denies Walesa Interference

LD0902143594 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1108 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] Warsaw, 9 Feb—Asked by a PAP journalist to comment on views that while signing Borowski's resignation, the president exerted influence on reaching a quick agreement within the coalition, Andrzej Zakrzewski, head of the office for political services to the president, said that Lech Walesa "does not interfere with the coalition, but simply learns what the coalition and the government are 'producing.'"

Zakrzewski added that the president signed Borowski's resignation "in accordance with the procedures."

"According to the president, what happened is the internal matter of the coalition and the government; the matter of observing the agreements and following the procedure of changes in the cabinet. The president has nothing to do with it, and he can only accept the changes, and this is what he did," Zakrzewski said.

Asked whether he does not think that the president accepted Borowski's resignation unexpectedly quickly, Zakrzewski replied: "The president is always quick."

Commentary on Coalition Crisis

WS0902152694 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Feb 94 p 2

[Commentary by Krzysztof Gottesman, under the "Observations" rubric]

[Text] The governing coalition, despite the agreement reached on Tuesday [9 February] night, is going through a serious crisis. In the middle of the budget debate, we first witnessed the recall of Deputy Finance Minister Stefan Kawalec, and a few days later—the recall of Marek Borowski, deputy prime minister and finance minister. Among observers and politicians were, and probably still are, people who do not rule out the possibility of a split within the coalition. Some are already counting the votes in new configurations. A return to a state of balance may turn out to be short-lasting.

All this is happening seemingly before the eyes of the people. Seemingly—because on television screens we can most often see first of all Polonezes, Mercedeses, and Lancias, in which participants of the talks arrive at various entrances; these are frequently back entrances. Sometimes we can see politicians entering a building: Either they have a not too intelligent joke to tell, or do not condescend to say anything to journalists' questions at all. Those who are criticizing their partners for not having an appropriate information policy are also acting this way. The prime minister's press secretary most often says that she has nothing to say.

It all changes a little when the politicians come to the conclusion that the situation is under control to such a degree that a few general sentences can be said about the reached agreement. This is exactly what happened yesterday night. The preparations for the meeting at Parkowa Street were made in strict secrecy. Journalists and photo reporters were constantly misled by all possible methods.

Especially at important moments, politicians have the right, and maybe the duty as well, to hold talks quietly, without any microphones and camera lenses. It is more than certain that appropriate services would be able to organize such a meeting of the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and Polish Peasant Party. However, if the prime minister—the chairman of the greatest Deputies' Club, the Sejm speaker, and a few other politicians do not want to take advantage of such a possibility, then it is their duty to the public to issue information about such negotiations. No matter what the result is. Otherwise, no one should be surprised at the reluctant attitude of the mass media toward the authorities.

Solidarity Stages Mass Demonstration in Warsaw

LD0902174494 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1700 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] A demonstration by Solidarity took place in Warsaw today, in protest against price increases, falling workers' incomes, and the increase of the number of unemployed. Changes in the budget for this year were demanded.

In a speech made before the office of the Council of Ministers, Union Chairman Marian Krzaklewski demanded the adoption by 15 March this year of the laws comprising the pact on the state enterprise. He announced that there will be further demonstrations if this is not done. Over and above that, he said that Solidarity is preparing its own draft constitution, one that is representativeof the entire independence-oriented and Solidarity sector.

The participants in the demonstration delivered petitions into the hands of Deputy Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych and Council of Ministers Office Head Michal Strak. In the petitions the trade unionists are demanding changes in the budget for this year that would allow for a decrease in the growing negative economic and social phenomena.

The participants in the demonstration included Jan Olszewski, Jan Parys, Adam Glapinski, and also groups from the Movement for the Republic and the Third Republic Movement. According to the police controlling traffic, around 30,000 people took part in the demonstration, and according to Marian Kraklewski around 100,000.

Solidarity Chairman on Draft Budget Opposition

LD0902210194 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Over 30,000 trade unionists from Solidarity have demonstrated in Warsaw against this year's draft budget, the decrease in incomes, and the increase in the numbers of unemployed. Solidarity Chairman Marian Kraklewski said that the demonstration today is solely a component in the struggle for welfare rights. However, he added that if the government does not fulfill the trade union postulates, Solidarity will organize successive demonstrations, this time directed against the government.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] In the view of the organizers, at least 40,000 trade unionists came to Warsaw. The police spoke of 30,000, but everyone was in accord in stating that the demonstration was an enormous one. The demonstrators demanded the cessation of increased energy and gas prices, an increase in expenditures on social welfare benefits, an active struggle against unemployment, the adoption by 15 March of laws relating to the pact on the state enterprise, and a 2-percent increase in remuneration within the productive sphere. Solidarity Chairman Kraklewski warned that if the government does not take into account these postulates, then the next demonstrations will have a political character.

[Krzaklewski] [video shows Krzaklewski marching in demonstration, talking to correspondent] If the government does not fulfill the social welfare and economic tasks in accordance with economic tendencies, and with the expectations of society, then the next stage is a demonstration against the authorities which are incapable of implementing something such as this. This is natural. Such is the course of affairs in democratic states. However, today's demonstration is not against the government but against the decisions and plans of this government. It is (?grinding us down). The next might be political.

[Correspondent] What do you think about the postulates contained in the Solidarity petition?

[Labor Minister Leszek Miller] It is difficult for me to agree with many of them. For instance, the shock increase in prices. The union is here doubtless thinking of the increase in the price of energy. Well, precisely. Instead of two large increases there will be three smaller ones. The rate in the increased prices of energy carriers is less this year than it was last year. Or else there is the accusation that the government is not implementing the earlier Solidarity postulates, normally when it is the pact on the state enterprise that is being spoken about. The laws comprising the pact have been sent to the Sejm. Two of them have already been adopted. The rest are at the disposal of the Sejm Extraordinary Commission. I think that they will shortly be adopted. To sum up, many of these postulates are quite simply being implemented.

[Correspondent] The demonstrators walked down the Royal Way, from Pilsudski Square to the office of the Council of Ministers [URM]. However, not all the trade unionists got there; when the head of the march was holding a rally before the URM, the end had not yet left Pilsudski Square, a few kilometers away. [passage omitted] The demonstrators also chanted before the seat of the government, Left leg there, fear God there, and Red rascals. After a few minutes, a trade union delegation entered the URM and presented URM Head Michal Strak with the Solidarity postulates.

[Strak] I accept this stance. I will pass it on to Prime Minister Pawlak. I wish to say that this government knows why and by whose votes it found itself here, where it finds itself.

[Correspondent] After the talks, Minister Strak tried to go out and meet the demonstrators. [passage omitted] The demonstration ran its course calmly. Nonetheless, its size meant that traffic in the center of Warsaw was paralyzed for several hours. [end recording]

[Announcer Malgorzata Szelewicka] Are you pleased with the course of the demonstration?

[Krzaklewski] I am pleased. I am edified by this enormous turnout and the determination shown today by union members. I do not agree of course with the figures that were given. [passage omitted]

[Szelewicka] Two days ago Premier Pawlak said on the Wiadomosci program that the government ought to break with the liberal policy of the previous governments. What is the union demonstrating against?

[Kraklewski] Well, we have demonstrated against obvious facts. Against the draft budget law, that in effect, according to our experts' stance too, will bring about a successive year of impoverishment for workers and their families. In addition, other families, those of pensioners and others. We cannot agree that in the third year of economic growth, the incomes of Polish families again decline. Such a rule, to the effect that with economic growth there is an increase in the incomes of employees and the incomes of families, is a certain fundamental rule of market systems, economic and social. It cannot be

other than thus, for in that case when are the incomes of the populace to increase, if not with such a large economic growth as has been signalled in 1993, as is being signalled in 1994?

[Szelewicka] You said that the time might still come when there will be a struggle for power. When?

[Kraklewski] The time will come, above all, for the presentation of a stance toward the government, a political stance. At the moment, the government does not reflect upon this demonstration. I listened to the statement by Mr. Miller. It frightened me, especially after such a demonstration. I saw this enormous charge of tension, charge of hurt. After all, these people came in such numbers.

[Szelewicka] Why did that statement frighten you?

[Kraklewski] It frightened me because of its inaccurate reflection, on the evaluation of the mood that has accumulated in relation to this government policy.

[Szelewicka] The mood?

[Kraklewski] The mood is very radical. People came in such numbers because they really do feel bad. After all, they would not come because someone ordered them to. They feel very bad. They clearly feel this burden on their own backs. And we had to apply much of our authority and many measures putting things in order so as to control this enormous feeling. We controlled it thanks to the fact that these were trade union structures. If this had been a political demonstration, by everyone against the government, then I don't know what it would have looked like.

[Szelewicka] Many politicians of the right took part in the demonstration. Is this a foretaste of cooperation?

[Krzaklewski] I don't know if there were many. In relation to the number of demonstrators this is a very small percentage. We did not forbid anyone attending.

[Szelewicka] [Words indistinct] a significant number?

[Kraklewski] Yes, but in relation to almost 100,000 demonstrators, according my calculations, a dozen or so or a few dozen politicians? These are, above all, politicians who supported this demonstration as a demonstration not only in favor of social welfare solutions, but as a demonstration for another economic program, one that the government ought to present.

[Szelewicka] Thank you very much.

[Kraklewski] Thank you very much.

Spokesman Chebeleu Discusses Snegur Statements

AU0802193894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Text] The statement made by President Mircea Snegur at the congress "Our Home, the Republic of Moldova" on 5 February in fact reveals the fact that the people of the Republic of Moldova have everything in common with Romania, such as history, culture, aspirations for a democratic life and for freedom, and a need for peace and security, said the spokesman of the Romanian Presidency, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu in an interview he granted to our radio station today.

According to Mr. Traian Chebeleu, the statement by President Mircea Snegur shows in fact how strong is the pressure put on the Republic of Moldova by the nostalgic-imperial forces; another important factor is the electoral campaign, which is marked by the offensive of the pro-Russian forces that wish to achieve the closest possible bondage of the Republic of Moldova with the CIS, also through treaties.

In his interview, Mr. Chebeleu also mentioned that the actions in our county that call on Romania to take firm steps to recuperate those territories that were severed in June 1940 and the unrealistic slogans regarding the unification of the Romanian territories have, in fact, assisted the forces that are seeking to pull the Republic of Moldova away from Romania.

Thus, I believe that one should not dramatize the emphasis placed on the idea of the Moldovan nation or on non-unification with Romania, obviously due to the circumstance of the electoral campaign, because these are theories that remind us of well-known Bolshevik concepts, said Mr. Traian Chebeleu.

He also mentioned that Romania is the strongest supporter of the Republic of Moldova in the international community and that the policy that our country has promoted and continues to promote is to consolidate the independence of the Republic of Moldova and to constantly take concrete actions to gradually bring the two states closer to each other.

Asked whether the future opinion poll that will take place in the Republic of Moldova on the issue of its independence will not sanction the concept of complete separation from Romania, Mr. Traian Chebeleu said that this might also play a positive role if the independence of the Republic of Moldova is more and more frequently questioned by political forces in the Russian Federation, whose representative is the nationalist extremist Zhirinovskiy. One can also expect that the poll will confirm people's option to consolidate their independence in a way similar to that practiced in the Baltic republics.

Moldovan 'Hatred' After Snegur Speech Viewed

AU0902215394 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 7 Feb 94 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "Hatred Against Romania Has Been Unleashed in Chisinau"]

[Text] The end of last week was dominated by the spectacular statements made by President Mircea Snegur and Dumitru Motpan, president of the ruling party in the Republic of Moldova, on the issue of relations with Romania. As far as we could learn from the reports of press agencies, at the congress of the Civic Alliance in the Republic of Moldova, an organization set up in order to give unconditional support for President Mircea Snegur, the latter declared that the unification with Romania must be eliminated from the preoccupations of the political life in the Republic of Moldova and any stand toward Bucharest must proceed from the delimitation of the term Moldovan from the term Romanian. In Mircea Snegur's view, the Romanians in Bessarabia are not Romanians, but Moldovans, and it is not the Romanian language that is spoken between the Prut and Dniester Rivers, but the Moldovan language! Thus, as Dumitru Motpan, the leader of the Agrarian Democratic Party of the Republic of Moldova, said in a speech made on the same day at an electoral meeting in the locality of Cantemir, if the issue of unification is ever raised, this will mean not Romania, but only a part of it, namely Moldavia, and the Republic of Moldova and Moldavia will make up, in the view of those in Chisinau, one single nation, namely the Moldovan nation. The affirmations of Mircea Snegur and of the leaders of the ruling party in the Republic of Moldova were not just some statements made during a drinking bout. They were made in an official framework and, what is more serious, with the intention of making them, from now on, become a fundamental idea of the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova.

As such, the affirmations of the two leaders are not at all surprising. The categorical rejection of the unification has, for quite a while, been one of the dominant ideas of the policy promoted by Mircea Snegur. The fact that people in Bucharest viewed this issue differently is very simple to explain. Mircea Snegur's true position has been hidden under a veil of ambiguous smiles, smiles meant to put the Chisinau leadership in the role of a lamb that is feeding from two sheep. Smiling at both Russia and Romania, Mircea Snegur was able to obtain significant economic aid from both countries. The illusion created by Mircea Snegur's duplicity was supported for a long time by the special relations of the Republic of Moldova with President Ion Iliescu. Did anybody realize that the Chisinau leader is a ferocious anti-unionist, more than certain that the "brotherly" Snegur-Iliescu meetings would have led to the deterioration of Ion Iliescu's electoral capital. The affirmations made by Mircea Snegur and Dumitru Motpan are not surprising, not in the least, if we look at the current situation in the Republic of Moldova. Elections are approaching beyond

the Prut River. And considering that the unification with Romania does not seem to be favored by the great majority of the population, including Romanians, Mircea Snegur and his people, in order to win the elections, saw themselves compelled to make the issue of rejecting unification a whipping boy of the electoral campaign. If, taken as they are, the declarations of the two leaders are not surprising, nevertheless, the feelings that can be guessed behind them are shocking. To the astonishment of the Romanians, the declarations made at the end of last week betray a genuine hatred for the Romanians in Romania. Willingly or unwillingly, the two leaders want to picture us as a mortal danger for the interests of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova. One can see clearly that Mircea Snegur and Dumitru Motpan intend to lead an electoral campaign based not only on the rejection of unification, but also on stirring up hatred against us, that is, the Romanians on this side of the Prut River. No matter what is reason for this goal, the attempt to implement it is as dangerous as possible for Romania. Since the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, the economic, social-political, and cultural relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova have increased. Within the framework of this process, the Romanians in Romania have become a real presence beyond the Prut River both through the numerous trips they made there, and through the numerous private firms and cultural organizations that they have established there. The declarations of the two leaders might be the beginning of violence of great proportions against all Romanian citizens present, for one reason or another, in the Republic of Moldova. In the case of correspondents Anda Florea and Mircea Dascaliuc, this is most significant. From this point of view, it would not be an exaggerated act if Romanian citizens would be advised to avoid, at least for the period of the electoral campaign, trips to localities beyond the Prut River. This would be beneficial not only for them, but also for the cause of unification.

PDSR on IMF Memorandum, Snegur Statements

AU0802205394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Text] Mr. Oliviu Gherman, president of the ruling Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], said at his party's news conference today that the provisions of the IMF memorandum, which are a substantial part of the economic policy of our country, must be discussed in the parliament because the ruling party is interested in having this accord represent the political option of all parties and should not be solved through a simple signature on the document.

Regarding another issue, Mr. Gherman assessed that the open letter addressed to the parties that belong to the Democratic Convention and the Democratic Party represents the decision of the permanent delegation and means that the ruling party is open for political dialogue. In the view of the PDSR, three stages are necessary to finalize the dialogue: to establish the principles for a cooperation in the political arena; to work out a program regarding the unfolding of the reform in Romania; and to hold discussions on the basis of a government coalition.

Referring to the recent declarations made by the president of the Republic of Moldova and Agrarian Party leader, Ioan Solcanu, vice president of the PDSR, expressed his concern that such pro-Russian ideologies tend to become state policy. The message of the PDSR is the following: We should not forget that all of us are Romanians and history cannot be distorted according to momentary interests.

Coalition Government Blamed for Nation's Image

AU0802191694 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 2 Feb 94 p 1

[Editorial by Ion Cristoiu: "Who Is Interested in Making Us Appear in the World as a Nation of Cunning People"]

[Text] The government coalition has made and continues to make a big fuss about our image in the world. Through this image, one certainly understands not only opinions about Romania of today but also about the Romanians as a nation. Therefore, the left-wing coalition, sprinkled with nationalism, has protested against Romania being presented abroad either as a bloodthirsty nation or a nation of profiteers. From this point of view, the criticism of certain exaggerated adventures of some of our fellow citizens abroad was more than justified. On the basis of the fact that in who knows what capital city of the world, a Romanian has been caught stealing something, the conclusion often drawn is that the Romanians are a nation of petty thieves. Less justified were the explanations given by the government coalition for the bad image of Romanians in the world. The domestic and foreign press were accused of practicing falsifications and exaggeration. The pro-government and pro- presidential correspondents have carried out quite a few attacks against the so-called defamation of the Romanian realities by the domestic press, which is sold to the enemies of the country.

It is not excluded that the international press has also played a certain role in establishing our image as a nation. In the search for a sensation, it sometimes chooses something that is shocking in the life of a nation or a country. However, the major responsibility for the negative image, with which the name of Romania is associated in the world, should be sought elsewhere, namely some of the current actions of the ruling coalition—that is, precisely the force that is complaining everywhere about the distortion of our image abroad. A ominous example in this respect is the stand of the Romanian officials regarding the fulfillment of conditions that were set to us when we were admitted to the Council of Europe. When the famous amendments to the admittance documents were formulated, we stood at attention and shouted more than the gentle soldier Svejk: Yes, sir! We pledge to fulfill them and overfulfill them! Since they are serious people who know what a pledge

means, the Council of Europe admitted us. However, they pointed it out, in a polite but firm manner, that the amendments must be implemented in Romania's social and political life. At that time, they could not imagine that anything else might happen except that after our admittance to the Council of Europe, we would immediately and enthusiastically start implementing the solemnly made commitments. At that time, I was among the analysts who issued a warning—namely, that we should not play with fire. Some of the amendments—we said then—were absurd. They expressed the aberrant tendency of West Europe to impose rigidly its own living standards on the specific realities prevailing in East Europe. Thus, I was saying that it would have been much better if we had stated that we would not be able to fulfill all the conditions. Maybe we would not have been admitted to the Council of Europe, but we would have been much more honest, more correct, and, mainly, much closer to the national interest. All this, because it would be much more serious if the West had created an image about us as a nation that does not know how to keep its word than not admit us into the Council of Europe. Since we have been accepted, considering that we gave our solemn word, we should by all means start fulfilling the conditions set by the Council of Europe. My warning was based on a suspicion—that the Romanian officials do not intend to do anything toward the implementation of those amendments. When we were admitted to the Council of Europe, we acted in accordance with our old Dimbovita [river crossing Bucharest] style—that is, "We say as they say, but we do as we want." Unfortunately, my suspicion has been justified. After we had been accepted to the Council of Europe—that is, after we crossed the bridge—we did nothing to fulfill our promise. In Strasbourg recently, our parliamentary delegation was placed in an uncomfortable situation. When asked about the stage of implementation of the respective amendments, the delegation had to hum and how, stammer in embarrassment, and even lie. Considering that the people at the Council of Europe are very polite, they did not tell us what they thought about our attitude. However, I am sure that, among themselves, they thought immediately about the accusations voiced against us—that we are a nation of cunning and boasting people who promise a lot and do nothing. Then, is it not natural to ask who is contributing to the negative image that is circulating in the world about the Romanian people?

Spiroiu Denies Removal of 4th Army Commander

AU0902122694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0900 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] In an interview granted today to one of our correspondents, Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu, Romanian national defense minister, said that he, together with other top officials of the ministry, had examined in Cluj the 1993 balance of the 4th Army [the Transylvanian army], as well as aspects related to military discipline and order in that army. They found that the activity of the 4th Army was very well organized. Minister Spiroiu rejected allegations published in today's edition of the daily ULTIMUL CUVANT [THE LAST WORD] that he went to Cluj to remove the current commander of the 4th Army, General Paul Cheler. Spiroiu added that he regrets that such news is being circulated without first checking with the Army Press Office.

Spiroiu Wants To End Conflict With Tudor

AU1002104994 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 8 Feb 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "General Spiroiu Wants To End Conflict With C.V. Tudor"]

[Text] Romania's minister of national defense, General Niculae Spiroiu, declared in a television broadcast of the "Pro Patria" program that he wishes to end the conflict with Senator C.V. Tudor. "Let us consider it a closed chapter, we have much to do in the Army," said Mr. Spiroiu, although at the news conference of the Greater Romania Party on 3 February the leader of that party continued his accusations and slander against the dignitary, who is a member of the Vacaroiu government. He called the defense minister: "A minister who is a trafficker and a maniac," "a political adventurer," "the epitome of incompetence," and a person who "demolished the arms industry," "turned the ministry into a small feudal family," and "permanently misinformed the state institutions." Here are a few examples of the way Senator V.C. Tudor portrayed Minister Spiroiu at the recent news conference of the Greater Romania Party. Therefore, the general's decision to call for an end to the conflict is viewed as a more than surprising act, since Mr. Spiroiu has not even turned to the legal authorities to have Senator C.V. Tudor reprimanded for his remarks.

Hungarian Group Views Meeting With Iliescu

AU0802114994 Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 4 Feb 94 pp 1,8

[Interview with Bela Marko, chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, and Executive Chairman Csaba Takacs by Janos Gyarmath; place and date not given: "There Has Been No Breakthrough"]

[Text] At the initiative of Romanian President Ion Iliescu, the dialogue with the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ] reopened on 1 February, after an interval of almost a year. The long "diplomatic" recess in itself shows the tension between the presidential body and the RMDSZ, mainly as a result of the fact that the RMDSZ remained uncompromising even after its Brasov congress, did not discard its goals, and consistently adhered to its program; President Ion Iliescu has repeatedly expressed his resentment because of this. In his view, the national minority issue in Romania has been satisfactorily settled in every respect according to the international norms, the causes of

possible differences of views should be sought only among the minorities themselves, primarily the RMDSZ, who are fighting for privileges rather than for rights. Although Iliescu has hardly changed anything in his concept, he nevertheless invited the leadership of the RMDSZ for a dialogue on 1 February, probably in view of the events and unfavorable international reactions, as well as out of certain political considerations.

[Gyarmath] We have already cleared up the misunderstanding that it was President Iliescu, and not the RMDSZ, who initiated this meeting. As far as I know, the RMDSZ had prepared for the meeting and was ready for dialogue. Mr Marko, how did you actually prepare for this meeting, and what was its goal?

[Marko] It is well known that the RMDSZ had not been in the presidential palace for almost a year, but this does not mean that every contact was severed. Thus, before the start of the end-of- the-year consultations initiated by Ion Iliescu, it was not yet clear whether the parties of the Democratic Convention would appear together or separately, so we prepared for both possibilities. As is well known, a joint delegation met with Ion Iliescu after all, and our representatives, including myself, were also part of this delegation. However, under these circumstances, we could only summarily mention our particular demands and ideas. At the end of the talks, the president came up with a proposal to meet him separately, and we could not reject this offer because our organization favors an open dialogue and also because we had things to say to him. Our goal was finally to hand over the package of documents prepared by our Executive Committee.

[Gyarmath] What is in this package?

[Marko] Let us begin—precisely because of its timeliness owing to the approaching Council of Europe deadline on Romania's implementation of its proposals—with our memorandum to the Council of Europe and its appendix, which we sent to Strasbourg recently. The package also contains the bill on national minorities and autonomous communities formulated by the RMDSZ and registered by Parliament, a bill that we included for purposes of information and study, as well as numerous analyses, memoranda, and documentation regarding education, self-government bodies, the restitution of church properties, the fate of the convicts from Hargita county and Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures], and the increasingly tense inter- ethnic relations in the Kovaszna and Cluj counties. When describing the package of documents at the beginning of the meeting, I stressed that it contained all the essential problems facing the Hungarians living in Romania, and it listed not only the unsolved problems but also the solutions.

[Gyarmath] Therefore, we can practically call it a package of RMDSZ proposals....

[Marko] Obviously, because we presented solutions to the national minority issue and how the problems of the Hungarian community in Romania should be treated. We also indicated that this meeting was taking place at a time when four months had already passed since Romania's acceptance onto the Council of Europe, and two months before officials would visit Romania to see which Council of Europe proposals this country had implemented. We concluded that, in our opinion, none of these proposals had been implemented! Thus, the RMDSZ has not seen any progress either in the past four years or the past four months! Obviously, a lot of questions could already have been resolved, such as the issue of the convicts of Zetelak, Oroszhegy, and Marosvasarhely, which the president himself and other responsible government officials had promised would be solved by the end of last year.

[Gyarmath] How did the president receive all this?

[Marko] After a short presentation of the package of documents, we had a long talk and discussion for more than three hours, in the course of which we reviewed the essential issues included in these documents. I must immediately point out that, as I see it, the president has not changed his position expressed during previous meetings. Therefore, we told him that, as long as he thinks that there are no problems in legislation and in shaping legal frameworks in Romania, while we claim that we need totally new legal frameworks here, we cannot imagine how to seek a solution. Therefore, all that happened was that I myself and my colleagues listed and presented our positions on these issues with arguments and documents. The mere presentation of the problems showed that the situation was stagnating and opposite trends were emerging.

[Gyarmath] What conclusion did you draw in the end?

[Marko] As I see it, the president continues to hold a totally different position from ours; thus, the two positions have not come closer to each other and there has been no breakthrough. We can, however, call it a positive development that the president declared that they would study the documents presented by us and we would be informed about their conclusions in writing. At the same time, the president proposed to make this form of a dialogue a regular feature: a meeting every quarter of a year. In connection with this, we told him that this only made sense if these dialogues took place in the spirit of solutions, that is, if there is progress after these meetings. We refuse to engage in fruitless and empty dialogues. Of course, many things happen and many things are said at a meeting of more than three hours.

[Takacs] These negotiations have again proved the opposing viewpoints from which we approach the issues and democracy in Romania. It is well known that the RMDSZ is in favor of a general democratic restructuring, and the national minority issue is one of the components of this restructuring. At the same time, our opinions also differ on whether Romania's interests coincide with the interests of the current government. The positions regarding Romania, the Romanian people,

and the processes that accelerate or hinder this democratic restructuring became clear during the meeting. Thus, although Ion Iliescu made a lot of critical remarks about the RMDSZ address during this meeting, we refuted all of them one after the other. For example, he criticized us for sending a memorandum to the international forum and for formulating a reminder after four months. It clearly transpired from his approach to this and other issues that we have different ideas about democracy and progress. After all, strengthening local government bodies, decentralization, and the depolitization of state institutions are not only in the interest of the Hungarian minority but also in the interest of the Romanian people.

[Gyarmath] Thus, do you feel that a dialogue of the deaf took place in the Cotroceni Palace?

[Takacs] Not exactly, because, in my view, during the talks, the president slowly began to realize not only that the RMDSZ was presenting the issues from its own viewpoint, but that these issues can be either acceptable or disputable from the viewpoint of a political evaluation and approach. We stressed that in these documents, which also include proposals for solutions, we are starting from the facts, and not from presenting our demands, and it is impossible to refute the elements of reality. Nor is it refutable that general democracy and the introduction of European norms is also in the interest of Romania, and not only that of the opposition or of the RMDSZ. Therefore, we think that everything that is good for European democracy and everything that raises the standards of these societies in every respect is also good for Romania. Strangely enough, if we or the opposition say that, they regard it as a hostile manifestation. Therefore, we asked the president to try to build an objective information channel that shows reality, rather than serving power interests. For example, Iliescu had just learned that the judges in the trial of the Zetelak affair were Romanians, not Hungarians. It also transpired that the president had no idea of the discriminatory measures used in appointing people in Kovaszna county and of the ethnic pressures on so-called non-Hungarian families and children. Although it is clear that all this involves a violation of the Constitution, the president said that he had no idea of these things. Even if this is true, it does not mean that he is free from responsibility, because he himself chose his advisers and all those who inform him. Therefore, we can say that his team as a whole works uniformly against the Hungarians. We stressed that we were open to dialogue, and the fact that we handed over our document package for studying is a sign of this and, of course, we expect a response both in words and deeds. Thus, from our viewpoint, I regard this meeting as important because it provided an opportunity to inform the president about the issues and the political goals of the RMDSZ clearly, unequivocally, and without distortions, goals that we will not give up for any opportunistic considerations. As for making the dialogue between the presidency and the RMDSZ a regular one, we must stress that there is only sense in holding such meeting regularly if it has no hidden or show-policy aims, if the RMDSZ achieves results, and if the meeting is not used to show "results" to the international public opinion. In other words, the RMDSZ cannot and will not be a partner with any government that makes use of a policy of delay. We did not commit ourselves to negotiate for decades; we committed ourselves to only negotiate if there is a hope of achieving results.

[Gyarmath] How would you evaluate the meeting?

[Takacs] Obviously, we have a lot of reservations, and we can hardly say that we have found understanding. However, we cannot say that the meeting was useless. By presenting this document package in the spirit of our congress held in Brasso [Brasov], all we did was to put the ball into our opponent's court. No one will be able to say now that he does not know or understand what we want; we have carried out the necessary clarification.

[Gyarmath] Have you felt any political will toward resolving the issues, or even one single issue?

[Marko] Neither the opposition nor the RMDSZ should have any illusions or believe that any political change will take place soon. However, given that this issue requires a more lengthy explanation, I think we should let life give an answer and wait and see what happens.

Article Examines Zhirinovskiy's 'Imperialism'

AU0802113494 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 4 Feb 94 p 3

[Bogdan Burileanu article: "Zhirinovskiy Dismantles Romania"]

[Text] Zhirinovskiy's latest pronouncements leave no doubt at all about the designs of Russian imperialism on Romania. Doing us the "honor" of devoting a very suspect kind of attention to our country, the favorite horse of the Russian electorate has taken up once more his original thesis about the artificial nature of the Romanian state, which, according to his precarious historical knowledge, is inhabited by Italian Gypsies. Now he has also found a final solution to get rid of the Romanians: His long-term program envisages nothing more or less than wiping out Romania from the map! The western part of our country will be given to Hungary and the southern part to a future Greater Bulgaria. Let us not delude ourselves into thinking that Czar Boris' [Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation] "clown" is dreaming in vain or that he failed to pass his geography exams, as seems to be the case with the history exam. The fact that his statement makes no mention whatsoever of the northern and eastern parts of the country does not mean that he lost sight of them. Those territories (Moldova and South Bukovina, respectively) have whetted the appetite of Russian expansionism for ages. Let us not forget that, in the disastrous summer of 1940, the Romanian Army would have still been able to defend Transylvania against the implementation of the Vienna

Diktat [which allocated Northern Transylvania to Hungary]. But the Soviets mobilized their troops on the Prut River, ready to move up to the Carpathian Mountains, while the Bulgarian troops were actively dreaming of taking over all Dobrogea. In these conditions, the Crown Council decided to accede to the German-Italian verdict, which at least guaranteed the country's southern and eastern borders.

Unfortunately, Romania finds itself today in a similar situation of isolation as 54 years ago. Moreover, today's situation is even worse than at that time, if one thinks of the fact that there is no longer the oil stake or other lucrative concessions which can interest the West in any way. Regardless of what one hears, the Partnership for Peace [PFP] remains for the time being a mere euphemistic formula of passivity toward the same aggressive Russian claims as ever, while the United Nations and the CSCE amount to nothing more than what the League of Nations had been in the period between the two world wars.

On top of all this comes the Yugoslav inferno, where both the Islamic states and the spokesmen of the pan-Slavic trend are all so very eager to become involved. For both of these camps to reach there, there is but a single land route, namely through Romania. Washed with all waters, the Muslims are refraining from making statements, since the element of surprise and the prompt use of any favorable set of circumstances have always been the asset of the weak. On the other hand, Zhirinovskiy bangs the big drum with a brutality that defies all customs, thus making it all more threatening. It is not at all accidental that he is throwing such an appetizing territorial bait to his fellow travelers in both Hungary and Bulgaria, who are on the rise there. Encouraged by these strong statements coming from the East, it is quite likely that these forces will not take too long to begin manifesting themselves. As for the Arabs, they are very familiar with many strategic secrets of our country, since they did not cater to Ceausescu for nothing. The recent contacts established by certain extremist parties with various political forces in the respective countries—Ilie Verdet's Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] with Iraq and Greater Romania Party's [PRM] Corneliu Vadim Tudor doing the same thing on neutral ground, in Cardiff [PRM Leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor accompanied Romania's soccer team for an international match there in 1993], where he sent obscure messages from the toilets of the Welsh stadium, as we were told by some high officials of our secret service—come to complete the aberrant picture of an ever closer encirclement and imminent danger. The fact that the most vehement "nationalists" are the spokesmen of such interests should not come as a surprise to anyone. The wolf in sheep's clothing and the quisling have existed since times immemorial. Nevertheless, these dissolute elements have never expressed themselves more loudly, perfidiously, and destructively in the entire history of the Romanian people.

There is now a real need for defining and observing the national interest. Confronted with such dangers, those at the helm of the country must be aware of the huge responsibility devolving upon them for the political decisions they are taking. After all, it is obvious that our national existence cannot be defended now with tricky statements, greasy diplomacy, or obscure maneuvers. Romania's place should be unreservedly and unequivocally alongside of the Western nations, the only ones able to credibly guarantee our existence before the ordeals ahead of us. However, in order to be accepted and protected, the Romanians must prove, through facts, not only words, that they deserve the attention they really need. By mimicking democracy, we will not manage to fool anyone. On the other hand, we will just be left to drift alone, when fate does not seem to favor us so much.

President Iliescu refuses, in more or less veiled terms, to agree to the necessary change of orientation in the country's policy. He prefers to blackmail the West with our geostrategic position, pretending that he does not notice its main characteristic, namely that we are just one step away from a catastrophe, both territorial and temporal. Is his hatred or fear of the moral values of the civilized world so high? Anyhow, his fear manifests itself the same way as the feelings and attitudes of Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Husayn, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, and more recently Vladimir Wolfovich Zhirinovskiy do. The latter—self- proclaimed uncontested leader of an inevitable anti-Western offensive—has already sealed our destiny, a destiny which our national-socialist forces are ready to accept, because the civilized world will never accept a Funar [Gheorghe Funar, president of the Romanian National Unity Party], a Vadim [Corneliu Vadim Tudor, president of the Greater Romania Party], and the like of them. Consequently, their state of exaltation makes them commit suicide through isolation or self-destructive alliances. The tragedy is that, the same as the pharaohs, they want Romania also to disappear along with them.

Serbs Reject NATO Ultimatum; Weapons To Stay

AU1002123194 Paris AFP in English 1218 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 10 (AFP)—Bosnia's Serbs on Thursday rejected NATO's ultimatum to end their siege of Sarajevo and said their heavy weapons would not be removed from around the city. [passage omitted]

"NATO is since last night an international terrorist organisation and we will consider it as such until it changes its stance with regard to us," spokesman Miroslav Toholj told AFP. "From the first air strikes, war will spread throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and degenerate into World War III," he added, threatening to use weapons "never before used by the Serbs."

"We won't manage to shoot down 20 planes, but five, yes. That will be enough for people to understand that the others are not safe," he added.

Meanwhile the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' representation in Sarajevo said Thursday that it had recalled to Zagreb or Belgrade two thirds of its staff stationed in Serb-held areas of Bosnia. UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski said the move involved 10 of the 16 or so UNHCR employees stationed in Pale, near Sarajevo, and in the northwestern region of Banja Luka.

Janowski would not confirm earlier reports that the recall was part of an order to withdraw all UNHCR employees from the field or that some of these employees were being prevented from leaving by the Serbs. "We are having problems at the checkpoints but they are not hostages," he said.

In Belgrade, the new Serbian parliament Thursday put the ultimatum issued by the 16 nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on the agenda for its constituent session.

The proposal to discuss Wednesday's ultimatum came from ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party deputy Tomislav Nikolic, who proposed to write to all countries with which the rump Yugoslavia maintains diplomatic ties "that ultimatums do not settle wars."

Serbs Threaten Retaliation

AU1002120194 Paris AFP in English 1157 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 10 (AFP)—Bosnia's Serbs Thursday [10 February] rejected NATO's ultimatum to end their siege of Sarajevo and said their heavy weapons would not be removed from around the city.

"Despite this ultimatum, the Serb artillery will not move an inch," said their main spokesman, Miroslav Toholj. "We are ready to retaliate."

He called the NATO threat to hit Serb positions with air strikes if the artillery is not pulled back within 10 days as "a terrorist threat" and said the Serbs would respond "by all means" to any attack.

Serb-Muslim Cease-Fire Agreed

LD0902202794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1949 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 9 Feb (TANJUG)—Major General Manoljo Milovanovic, chief of the general staff of the army of the Srpska republic, stated this evening that a cease-fire coming into effect at noon tomorrow [10 February] was agreed at a meeting between Serb and Muslim military representatives this afternoon, with the mediation of General Michael Rose, UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

General Milovanovic said that an agreement was reached to place both Serb and Muslim artillery under UNPROFOR control for the duration of the cease-fire.

He explained that UNPROFOR has conveyed to the Muslim side the Serb side's proposal regarding the cease-fire and the setting up of a mixed military commission which will find ways to maintain the cease-fire. He added that the Muslim side has agreed to this.

The cease-fire will be guaranteed by UNPROFOR. Commissions will tour the entire front around Sarajevo in order to establish where these sensitive spots are and deploy UNPROFOR observers there to determine who is violating the truce, General Milovanovic stressed.

The chief of staff said he was surprised by General Rose's claim that some kind of an agreement was signed at today's meeting. He specified that nothing was signed and that all that was accomplished was a verbal agreement, whose details he cited. He emphasized that this is a truce and that the Muslim artillery is in no way exempt from it.

General Milovanovic added that UNPROFOR and the Serb and Muslim sides have assumed responsibility for inspecting all positions through mixed military commissions and devising ways to maintain the truce. These ways will be discussed tomorrow.

Confusion Over 'Verbal Agreement'

AU1002080594 Paris AFP in English 0248 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Geneva, Feb 10 (AFP)—Warring parties in the Bosnian conflict are to hold fresh peace talks here Thursday [10 February], just hours after NATO threatened to intervene with air strikes but also amid hopes that a hurried truce in Sarajevo will last.

Bosnian Serb and Moslem military officials agreed in principle Wednesday on a Sarajevo ceasefire, due to come into effect at midday Thursday (1100 GMT), and

pledged to remove their heavy weapons from around the beseiged capital, UN local commander General Michael Rose said. [passage omitted]

The head of the self-declared Bosnian Serb parliament, Momcilo Krajisnik, meanwhile cast immediate doubts on ceasefire deal, worked out at Sarajevo airport.

He said the Serbs would announce the conditions under which they would withdraw their heavy artillery at Thursday's talks here. [passage omitted]

The agreement was given a cautious welcome by EC mediator Lord Owen, who said: "People sign things and don't always live up to them."

But he added: "Frankly I think (the agreement) will prove to be a lot more productive (than NATO air strikes)."

Rose had announced after the airport meeting that he had reached the agreement "with full consent of their political and military authorities."

But confusion arose when Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic reported that the truce airport agreement included a five-day deadline for implementation.

That was immediately denied by the UN Protection Forces, and a spokesman, who asked to remain anonymous stressed: "Mr. Izetbegovic's version is very different. And since no document was signed, for the moment this is only a verbal agreement."

The second-in-command of the mainly-Moslem Bosnian Army Jovan Divjak, who was also present at the three-hour airport meeting, said he had no faith in the accord.

"It's a game by the Serbs to get out of the bind they are in after the massacre they carried out the other day." [passage omitted]

Silajdzic: No Agreement on Demilitarization

PM1002121694 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 10 Feb 94 p 1

[Telephone interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic in Geneva by Huda al-Husayni in London; date not given]

[Text] Following the cease-fire agreement reached in Sarajevo between the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims there, Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said over the telephone that a cease-fire had been agreed in Sarajevo after Serbian forces agreed to withdraw their heavy artillery for a distance of 30 km from Sarajevo. Silajdzic hoped that this would be the beginning of a new phase, "but no one knows whether or not the Serbs are going to implement it."

As is known, General Michael Rose, commander of the UN forces in Bosnia, said that he expects the agreement to be implemented fully as of midday today, Thursday.

We asked Haris Silajdzic: Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said yesterday (Wednesday) that Russia is against launching air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions. However, it supports making Sarajevo a UN protectorate. He said that Russia could send forces to implement the plan.

Haris Silajdzic said: We have not asked for Russian forces to be sent to Sarajevo.

[Al-Husayni] They are willing to come.

[Silajdzic] We have not requested any.

[Al-Husayni] Have you requested French, British, Ukrainian forces?

[Silajdzic] And forces from Islamic states.

[Al-Husayni] So you reject the dispatch of Russian forces to you.

[Silajdzic] I said we have not requested any.

[Al-Husayni] The Bosnian parliament proposed Bosnia's partition into four cantons....

[Silajdzic] It was the Croatian, not Bosnian, parliament which proposed Bosnia's partition into 18 cantons. The problem is that people do not follow the news of what is happening.

[Al-Husayni] Your representative to the United Nations agreed to Sarajevo's being turned into a demilitarized zone. Do you too agree to that?

[Silajdzic] We have not agreed to the demilitarization of Sarajevo, nor have we spoken about this matter.

[Al-Husayni] Your representative told British television that your agree.

[Silajdzic] A representative is a representative and a government is a government, of course.

[Al-Husayni] As a government, do you refuse to turn Sarajevo into a demilitarized zone?

[Silajdzic] No one has asked for demilitarization or nondemilitarization. UN Security Council Resolution 836 stipulates the Serbian forces' withdrawal and we are in the process of implementing this resolution.

[Al-Husayni] You are now in Geneva for the sake of implementing this resolution.

[Silajdzic] We are here for the sake of negotiations.

[Al-Husayni] What about the resolution's implementation?

[Silajdzic] It should be implemented on the ground.

[Al-Husayni] In brief, what peace plan is the Bosnian Government taking to Geneva?

[Silajdzic] It is an expanded plan. We are carrying plans, programs, and pages. I am carrying with me 10 kg of pages and papers full of proposals.

[Al-Husayni] What is your opinion of NATO's decision to issue an ultimatum to the Serbs before launching air strikes? Do you believe it is serious?

[Silajdzic] It is a serious organization, and I expect it to issue nothing but serious things. It is a very big organization, a world organization, the strongest military organization in the world, and its statements are bound to be serious. We take all its decisions seriously.

[Al-Husayni] Do you expect an air strike to be launched?

[Silajdzic] We expect nothing. We are awaiting the results of the NATO session, then we will see what is going to happen.

Welcomes NATO Ultimatum

AU1002090994 Paris AFP in English 0856 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Text] Geneva, Feb 10 (AFP)—Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said peace may be at hand this time in Bosnia.

"There is a line that has been crossed," he said, the line being the willingness to use force as NATO issued an ultimatum Wednesday [9 February] for an end to shelling of Sarajevo and withdrawal of heavy weapons.

It "might be the first step towards disengagement," he said.

Asked by AFP at his hotel here if the peace initiative would really work, after so many have failed, Silajdzic said: "I think it will."

Silajdzic is in Geneva for a Bosnian peace conference opening Thursday.

He said the withdrawal of the artillery of the besieging Serbs from around Sarajevo would not change the strategic balance since it is "not true you can protect troops with artillery." He said the only purpose of the Serb artillery was "to attack civilians."

Military experts in Sarajevo consider, however, that the Serbs' artillery advantage enables them to offset the numerical superiority of the mainly Moslem Bosnian troops defending the city against a 22-month Serb siege.

Silajdzic said that the NATO ultimatum could lead to a "balance of power and with a balance of power you will have peace." He denied that the Bosnians were outnumbered since he said they were fighting not just Bosnian Serb forces but troops from Serbia. "They can bring out more troops at any time," Silajdzic said.

Rose: Sarajevo Agreement 'Very Small Step'

AU0902210894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Report by Zoran Pirolic]

[Text] The negotiating process, which in recent days more or less progressed visibly within Sarajevo and outside it, simultaneous with NATO threats that it would bomb the Serb positions around the capital, culminated in a result whose true form, significance, and consequences still remain to be seen.

General Michael Rose, commander of the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who presided over the negotiations between the representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the aggressor, Serbian side, this afternoon said that this was a very small step in solving a very great problem. According to his words, the agreement has three basic points.

[Begin Rose recording in English] ....that there should be an immediate cease-fire in and around the city.... [end Rose recording]

[Words indistinct] and that there will no more attacks on the city or from within the city; second, that the UN peace forces would be posted at all key and sensitive locations outside of the city; third, that all heavy weaponry would be placed under UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] control; and fourth, that a joint commission would be formed to oversee this task. The joint commission would be headed by French General Andre (Subirou), commander of the UNPROFOR sector in Sarajevo. A series of details, and the establishment of locations for posting the Blue Helmets, will still have to be agreed, said General Rose. According to him, this might be the beginning of a normalization of life for Sarajevo citizens. The British general said that the cease-fire would go into effect at 1200 [1100 GMT] tomorrow [10 February], and that Brigadier General (Subirou) would deploy his troops as soon as possible. Asked to state the difference between today's and earlier agreements that were violated practically at the moment they were signed, General Rose said that the difference was that this time Karadzic's Serb army was ready to withdraw its heavy weaponry and to place it under the efficient control of the peace forces. This can be a result of the changed strategic circumstances in which they have found themselves, added the British general.

There were no conflicts regarding the definition of heavy weaponry, and Sir Michael Rose maintains that all weapons whose caliber exceeds 12.7-mm will be placed under control. The other question that could prove to be controversial, and that the aggressor's side will try to manipulate, is the distance to which the heavy weaponry should be withdrawn. General Rose believes that this issue is not of paramount importance, and that if a distance of some 30 km around Sarajevo is agreed upon, there are bound to be areas that are not appropriate for placing heavy artillery. UNPROFOR will work on

placing this weaponry under as tight control as possible. This, of course, also includes the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's heavy artillery.

There is no minimal distance from the city if the heavy artillery is under our control, said General Rose. No signatures were put on the agreement reached at Sarajevo airport, yet the Brit does not deem this to be a particularly significant detail. He said that the negotiations between the representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Serbian side continued and that they concerned a series of details connected to the agreement. The Brit said that he had met with President Izetbegovic today around noon, and that the president of the Presidency of our country asked for clarifications on three or four points, after which he authorized the military representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army to come to the airport and agree to the agreement.

In response to a question pertaining to the possibility of air strikes against the Serb artillery if the agreement is not observed, General Rose said:

I will keep my thoughts to myself, and leave the decision to General Jean Cot and Mr. Yasushi Akashi. He was optimistic when he added that everyone was now facing a complete change, but we have heard these words, in one form or another, from other commanders of the peace forces in Bosnia.

Izetbegovic, Generals Comment on Cease-Fire

AU0902203394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Zoran Babic report on news conference by President Alija Izetbegovic and members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina military delegation Generals Jovan Divjak, Mustafa Hajrulahovic, and Brigadier Ismet Dahic in Sarajevo on 9 February—recorded]

[Text] [Babic] At the beginning of the conference, while explaining to the correspondents the reasons why this news conference was called, President Alija Izetbegovic said:

[Izetbegovic] After the meeting, General Rose made a statement for the press that was neither precise nor clear enough. That is why I would like to clarify for our public the conclusion reached at the meeting. We concluded that a cease-fire should go into effect on the Sarajevo front tomorrow [10 February] at 1200 [1100 GMT]. At 1200, UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] patrols should proceed to the following locations: Zuc, Golo Brdo, Borije, Vidikovac, Grbavica, that is, the Brotherhood and Unity Bridge, and Dobrinja to establish whether the cease-fire is being observed, so that we can proceed to the next phase, which is collecting heavy Serbian weaponry.

We will collect all the heavy weaponry—that is, all of the Serbian weaponry over a 12.7-mm caliber. According to our estimate, this phase would, according to today's agreement, last some five days, after which the weapons would be immobilized; therefore, demobilized, rendered useless, ammunition and artillery pieces would be sorted out into separate groups and would be placed in a row of barracks where it could be efficiently controlled by UNPROFOR, or rather where efficient control would be possible. The enemy has accepted these conditions and, therefore, they came; I think that their delegation was headed by their chief of staff, General Milovanovic. [sentence as heard] Prior to beginning the talks, they announced that they had been fully authorized for this meeting pertaining to the withdrawal of heavy weaponry. If this agreement is not implemented, we will consider today's agreement invalid.

[Babic] Generals Jovan Divjak and Mustafa Hajrulahovic contributed additional clarifications.

[Divjak] We exclusively discussed the cease-fire and decided that UNPROFOR should set up control posts in order to establish if the cease-fire is being violated. What is important is the fact that the Serb army must withdraw its artillery in the next five days and place it in those areas where UNPROFOR forces will be able to control it. General Rose implied that during the next phase—since this agreement will be carried out in phases—we will discuss other provisions of Resolution 824. However, this is conditioned by the withdrawal of the artillery and its being placed under control as requested by our delegation.

[Hajrulahovic] I believe that we should stress that we know in detail the number of chetnik weapons and artillery pieces around Sarajevo; we know all the coordinates of these weapons—artillery pieces, that is—so, in order to avoid a regrouping of the forces, we proposed submitting a complete map with all the [word indistinct] weapons and artillery pieces. This would serve to prevent the aggressor's side from regrouping the weapons on some other part of the front in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Babic] One of the questions for President Izetbegovic pertained to what the Bosnian side intended to undertake if the Serbs should violate the cease-fire.

[Izetbegovic] We believe that as of 1200 tomorrow, and in the course of the next five days, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the establishment of the locations to which it should be withdrawn should begin. Therefore, we shall consider that the agreement has been violated if the Serb side refuses to withdraw the heavy weaponry, if in the meantime an attack, a bombardment of the city should occur, and if the snipers do not refrain from their activities. We will then consider the agreement invalid.

[Babic] In response to what would happen to the Bosnian weapons, Izetbegovic said:

[Izetbegovic] All this is being done in accordance with Resolutions 824 and 836, according to which we are not under any obligation to put any type of weaponry under [UNPROFOR] control. This does not mean that we are not ready to place our heavy weaponry under control.

However, we are under no obligation to do so, but this does not exclude our readiness to do so. We will probably do so, providing the Serbs place their weapons under control. However, this is the first task that needs to be accomplished.

UNHCR Orders Staff To Leave Banja Luka

AU0902151594 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] The staff of the Banja Luka UNHCR office today left the town. We received this piece of information a few minutes ago.

The head of the office, Fridrich Rotwate, informed Mayor Predrag Radic that he had received the order from New York. He said that he did not have any other details, or did not want to give them. The residents of Banja Luka who are working as haulage operators and drivers or are performing other jobs in that organization have stayed behind.

The officials of the International Red Cross stayed in Banja Luka and are performing their duties. Their head, Christian Brunner, told the mayor that they do not have plans at present to leave the town.

Serbs Threaten To Prevent Exit

LD0902144094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1248 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 9 Feb (TANJUG)—General Milan Gvero, deputy chief of the general staff of the army of the Srpska republic, told TANJUG today that the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] command in ex-Bosnia-Herzegovina has informed him that it will no longer tolerate the inspection of cargo carried by humanitarian convoys. He made it clear that he had received this message from General Angus Ramsey, UNPROFOR headquarters commander.

Gvero interprets this decision as an increase in the various pressures and threats aimed in recent days at the people of the Srpska republic as well as its political leadership and army. "Regrettably, it seems that this is being pursued by the international institutions present in this area whose mission should be of a peacemaking and unbiased nature," Gen. Gvero said. "Today, Gen. Ramsey phoned me and said that UNPROFOR had decided to refuse any inspection of their convoys," he said. "In other words, they regard checking convoys as an infringement of their freedom of movement."

Gvero, however, stresses that because of a large number of attempts to abuse these convoys the Serb side cannot tolerate their movement without checking their cargo. "We, just like the entire civilized world, regard inspection as a method of confidence-building rather than a curb on movement. No good would come of pushing through, in this way, a decision to refuse any inspection of their convoys," he said. "In other words, they regard checking convoys as an infringement of their freedom of movement."

Gvero also said that the Serb side has a report that UNHCR staff have been ordered to leave their offices on the territory of the Srpska republic. "We are checking this report and if it is true we shall prevent them from fleeing our territory," he said. "None of the measures taken by these institutions and organizations have been caused in any way by our conduct or actions."

"We do not accept ultimatums of any kind, while we are ready, just as we have been so far, for any kind of equitable and civilized cooperation," Gen. Gvero said in conclusion.

TANJUG Says Muslims Blamed for Shelling

LD0902142594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1244 GMT 9 Feb 94

[By TANJUG editor in chief Dusan Zupan; "pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 9 (TANJUG)—If logic and evidence still have any meaning in this world of ours, the Serb side has provided more than convincing arguments to prove that it could not have been responsible for the tragedy at a Sarajevo open air market on Saturday.

Most of the allegations presented by the Muslim authorities, from the allegations about the number of dead (68) and wounded (197) to those about the causes of the explosion, have been disproved by photos from the scene of the tragedy and subsequent analyses of technical details by experts who have warned that the incident has no doubt been stage-managed.

There is always a motive for every crime, including the one in Sarajevo. It is completely overlooked that the effect of the massacre has not been the same in the case of all the interested sides.

Croats, who have been on the brink of coming under the blow of international sanctions because of their military intervention in Bosnia, now breath more easily. Zagreb is no longer the focus of international criticism.

As for the Muslims, they have temporarily quieted the mounting dissatisfaction in the world over their increasingly clearer commitment to the continuation of the war and not peace talks.

After the joint visit to Sarajevo of the Turkish and Pakistani prime ministers, conceived as a political propaganda attraction, failed to produce the desired effect, Muslim strategists in Sarajevo once again decided to apply the earlier tested formula—blood and carnage—as the most effective and efficient means of the battle for domination in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The strong inclination of the Muslim leadership to resort to the above formula was clearly recorded on July 14,

1992 by the then U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Commander in Bosnia Lewis Mackenzie in a letter to the then UNPROFOR commander, Indian General Satish Nambiar and ranking U.N. official Marrack Goulding, according to a decoded text of the letter, a copy of which TANJUG has. Canadian General Mackenzie described in the letter, among other things, his conversation with Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic.

"My conversation yesterday has convinced me once and for all that the president will only accept intervention or death for 'his' people as final solution (his words). There have been many opportunities for negotiations over the past few days, which he has rejected, including an overture by his SDA party, who wanted to meet with the Serbs...he (Izetbegovic) indicated that if the international community was not prepared to intervene, than he was prepared to "die twice," rather than deal with the "aggressor."

"Indications in Sarajevo point to a desire by the presidency (Muslim) to perpetuate the current crisis."

General Mackenzie was compelled to withdraw from his post and go into retirement, among other reasons, because he wrote in the letter, "They (Muslims) could target us, and try to make it look like the Serbs did it." It is more than obvious that the Bosnian Muslim policy has not changed and it is, therefore, not at all surprising that Muslims prevented unbiased experts from conducting a regular investigation at the scene of the event, from performing autopsies, and examining wounds.

According to the latest indications by reliable sources, UNPROFOR has this time again mustered the strength to send to the U.N. headquarters a report saying that the Muslim side is reponsible for the crime at the Sarajevo market. It remains to be seen whether an extra effort will be made and the report be published. If so, it will be a headway compared with the case of the concealed report about the massacre in Save Miskin Street (in 1992), which was used as a prelude to the introduction of the sanctions against Yugoslavia. The concealing of the latest facts, or their possible forging, could be used as a pretext for air strikes against the Serbs.

Not only Croats and Muslims have emerged as "winners" from the massacre in Sarajevo, but also western media, which have again a priori and in chorus condemned the Serbs as the side responsible for the crime. The tragedy at Sarajevo's Markale market was given high priority by media, especially CNN TV, which will bring new clients, higher circulation or rating, and more advertisements to those advocates of war while they await the next media attraction, if possible air strikes against Serbs, which they have openly been calling for. It is most likely for that reason that foreign news agencies on Tuesday evening said nothing about TANJUG's report that there exists of an UNPROFOR report which says that the Muslims are reponsible for the latest massacre in Sarajevo.

What a paradox. The only losers have been Serbs, because, even if they are not bombed, they have again been satanized before a large part of the world public and have a priori been charged as criminals and the guilty side. The only consolation is that it is beyond doubt that "lies have short wings" and that in the long run, no matter how long it takes, the anti-Serb propaganda will boomerang.

It is up to the world public to decide whether the latest Muslim-staged incident will, despite all the available facts, including the UNPROFOR report, and without a serious international investigation, be used to launch air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. If it is, many things could become so complicated that they would get out of control.

It is for that reason that the United Nations, that is, those who rule the world organization, should at least this time follow the advice of Canadian General Mackenzie that Izetbegovic "must be forced to the table" to negotiate.

For as long as that it is not done, there will be new Markalas and unnecessary innocent casualties.

'Remote Control' Expert Seen at Blast Site

LD0902193394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1857 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Feb 9 (TANJUG)—A man with glasses, filmed by the British television station SKY NEWS a day after the massacre at the Sarajevo market on Saturday, is an expert for remote control, TANJUG learned on Wednesday.

Fahrudin Orucevic, an electronics engineer, is the director of a military institute. He was recognized by a collegue from work who was watching the SKY NEWS program.

The footage, broadcast by Belgrade Television on Tuesday, shows Orucevic trying to avoid a British reporter who asked him what he was doing at the market as he was seen measuring something. He then walked away, ran across the street and entered a parked vehicle.

His former collegue, who asked not to be named in order not to jeopardize the security of a number of people from the institute, categorically claims that Orucevic could have been in charge of a timer—part of the mine which exploded at the Sarajevo market.

He claims that, before the war, Orucevic was employed in Sarajevo's firm SDU which manufacutred remote control systems, and that one year before the start of the war he was in Turkey as the manager of the remote control in a mine.

As soon as the war broke out, Orucevic was appointed as director of the Unis Institute, one of the numerous military factories in the former Yugoslav Republic of

Bosnia-Herzegovina which manufacture weapons and ammunition for the Moslem army.

Unis was founded and managed by current Moslem Presidency Vice-Presidemt Ejup Ganic who is one of the leading ideologists of the fundamentalist Islamic followers of Alija Izetbegovic.

Bihac Under Siege; 'Chetnik Hordes' Attacking

AU1002131194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic]

[Text] For the fifth day running the chetnik hordes are carrying out attacks with all available means. They are bringing new forces and hardware all the time and are constantly attacking Bihac and the Cazin commune.

(?Four) brigades of the Serbian aggressor reinforced with police units from Banja Luka, Prijedor, Drvar, and 200 artillery pieces of various kinds have already been on the offensive for five days now, destroying civilian facilities and (?pounding) every millimeter of the defense line. The attacks with 155-mm howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, tanks, and mortars of all calibers are horrific, but the defenders, who are defending the Bihac region and Bosnia- Herzegovina bare-handed, have put up heroic resistance. In brief, this is the picture of what happened on the (?Grmusko-Srbljanski) plateau, Hasin Vrh, and Barakovac last night and this morning.

The chetniks are attacking in waves, treading over their dead comrades, and leaving them behind. This illustrates sufficiently that their intentions are to enter Bihac. There is hand-to-hand fighting.

According to the old recipe, the chetniks are trying to make up for every failure to breach the lines by attacking civilian facilities. According to the unconfirmed reports, several civilians have been wounded. Some of them have been killed. There are a large number of wounded defenders. Material damage is immeasurable.

The Assembly of the Bihac Commune and the Command of the 5th Corps have again contacted the UN and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] vehemently protesting, reminding the sleepy international community of the fact that it has declared this very region to be a protected zone, of Resolution 836, of the bloody rampage of the Serbian aggressor, and of the suffering of the innocent.

Stocks of food have long ago run out. The overcrowded hospitals are without medicines. Humanitarian aid has not arrived for a long time. This is all being watched with indifference by those who issued new ultimata and alleged threats yesterday. Will the new massacres, victims, and suffering of a nation again be allowed in front of everyone?

The morale of the defenders, the heroes of the 5th Corps, is exceptional. The support of the people from all sections of the free parts of the region is limitless. There are more and more volunteers who are arriving to join the units to defend, as they say, their region and human dignity with their bodies. While we are reporting fierce hand-to-hand fighting is under way on the (Grmusko-Srbljanski) plateau and Barakovac. Artillery shells are showering down on every part of the defenders' line and the entire Bihac region. A message is being sent from every part of this region: Bihac will be defended, regardless of the fact that more chetniks are being brought. According to information available at present, some 2,000 chetniks are on their way.

Serbs Continue 'Bestial Attack'

AU0902153094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] The Serbian aggressor is continuing the fiercest offensive to date against Bihac Commune. The offensive has now entered its fourth day. Mirza Sadikovic reports:

They have been attacking the (Grmusko-Srbljanski) plateau, [name indistinct], and Barakovac throughout the day, that is, they are persistently shelling the forward defense lines on the Bihac part of the front. In addition to this, they have continued to shell Bihac and the outskirts of (Kakanj) Commune. Our defenders are in full control of their positions [words indistinct]. The 5th Corps Command has lodged another protest with the UN Protection Force over the shelling of Bihac, while Hamdija Kadilic, chairman of the communal assembly, has also lodged a sharp protest with the United Nations over the bestial attack on Bihac Commune, which has been declared a safe haven. [passage indistinct]

Izetbegovic Calls On UN To Prevent Massacre

AU0902153294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] In a letter sent today to the UN Security Council, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency informs this body that the Serbian aggressor has launched a fierce attack at the region of Bihac.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has successfully repelled the brunt of the enemy attack, but everything implies that the Serbs will not refrain from trying to capture this region, which is a safe haven under the control of UN forces.

President Izetbegovic has asked the international community's Security Council and NATO to intervene swiftly to prevent new massacres and ethnic cleansing in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Army Repels Serb Assault in Central Bosnia

AU1002114594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Text] The fiercest enemy offensive hitherto is continuing in the zone of operations of the 7th South Operative Group. The offensive on the free territories of the Tesanj, Maglaj, Doboj, and Teslic communes has been going on for 25 days. The most difficult situation was in the zone of operations of the 203d Glorious Motorized Brigade of Doboj-Bosnia. After crossing the Usora River, the chetniks attacked Karusce, where they were successfully repelled as they have been on so many occasions in the past. Two hours later, a chetnik sabotage group was infiltrated in this region, but it fared in the same way as all the previous ones. The 110th Glorious Usora Brigade told us that over 500 projectiles of all calibers landed on the defense lines in this area overnight.

The enemy's forces and hardware were repositioned in the operational zone of the 207th and 202d brigades this morning. The [Serbian] aggressor is preparing an artillery and infantry attack.

Serbs Continue 'Heavy Bombardment' of Olovo

AU1002102994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Text] On the Olovo front, the [Serbian] aggressor is continuing artillery and tank attacks on the defense lines and residential areas in the Krivaja valley. Heavy bombardment of the Olovo territory began after 0800 [0700 GMT] this morning. The aggressor's antiaircraft guns and small arms are also active. In addition to constant provocations, the occupier is also regrouping. Enemy helicopters have also been noticed overflying the area.

Muslim-Croat, Inter-Muslim Fighting Continues

LD0902191894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1909 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Zvornik, Feb 9 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Moslems and Bosnian Croats on Wednesday continued their fierce fighting at unabated intensity in southern and central parts of this ex-Yugoslav republic, Bosnian Serb army sources said.

Their fighting was the fiercest in southern Bosnia and in the Mostar region, then outside Vitez, Kiseljak, Zepca and Zavidovici.

Sources of the two sides indirectly confirm that the Moslems were sustaining big losses in central Bosnia.

Inter-Moslem armed provocations also continued in the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APWB), as tensions were mounting amongst local population ahead of the expiration on Thursday of the deadline set by the fifth command of Bosnian Moslem forces loyal to the Moslem authorities in Sarajevo. The ultimatum wanted an unconditional surrender by the APWB forces.

The APWB signed separate peace with Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, striving for a peaceful solution to the three-nations conflict in the central ex-Yugoslav republic.

Moslem forces in the past 24 hours continued provocations and offensive actions towards the Serb side on a number of battlefronts. [passage omitted]

Muslims Preparing for Offensive on Novi Travnik

PM1002130494 London THE EUROPEAN in English 11-17 Feb 94 p 3

[Report by Ali Moghnie in Sarajevo, incorporating interview with "high-ranking Bosnian Muslim military commander" Rustum Kadic— date not given: "Muslims Ready To Launch Spring Military Offensive"]

[Text] The Bosnian Muslims are preparing to launch an attack against Dolina rijeke Lasva (the valley of the river Lasva) between Zenica and Mostar in the spring to consolidate their position around Sarajevo, according to a high-ranking Bosnian Muslim military commander.

In an interview with The European, Rustum Kadic said the attack would be directed against Novi Travnik (half of it already controlled by the Muslims and the other half by the Croats), Vitez (the Muslims control the old part of the city) and Busovaca, Kiseljak, and Kresevo (all under Croat control).

But in the light of the mortar attack on Sarajevo's market square, the plan may be revised. Air strikes on Serbian positions around the town, or any Nato-induced withdrawal by the Serbs, would offer the tempting option of an immediate push by the Muslims to follow up and gain territory.

Such a move, which the UN would undoubtedly try to prevent, could signal the start of the Muslims' spring offensive, which has a series of objectives, according to Kadic. They want to break the Serbian ring around Sarajevo by liberating Kiseljak, near Vitez, and reduce their own commitment in the area to redeploy forces on other fronts, Kadic said. They also want to capture vital arms factories in Novi Travnik and Vitez, and aim to supplant the Croats in controlling the relief aid routes.

If the Muslims gain control of Kiseljak, they will be able to cut the Croats' supply lines from the Serbs in the east. By controlling Busovaca the Muslims would ease links along the valley, currently dominated by Croat snipers who are inflicting heavy casualties on the Muslims. According to Bosnian military commanders, more than 1,000 Muslim fighters have died on that road.

There is already heavy fighting between the Muslim-led Bosnian army and Croat separatist forces in the Vitez area which closed the main aid route into the Croat enclave.

"We can achieve our aims. However there is a risk of a large number of casualties," Kadic said. "When we took

back Kakanj and Vares, the Croatian fighters took shelter in Kiseljak, which became a fortress."

Muslim politicians in Sarajevo oppose the plan because of potential losses. But Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic backs the military commanders. The military headquarters of the Bosnian Muslims has been transferred to Zenica from Sarajevo.

Serbs Not Allowed To Control Convoy Contents

LD0902175894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1734 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 9 (TANJUG)—The command of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the war-torn former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has notified the command of the Bosnian Serb army that they will no longer allow them to control the contents of shipments in humanitarian aid convoys, Assistant Commander of the Serb Army Milan Gvero told TANJUG on Wednesday.

General Gvero was told the decision by the Commander of UNPROFOR Headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina British General Angus Ramsey, judging the Serb control of convoy contents to be "an infringement on the freedom of movement."

Due to many attempts at abusing these convoys, the Serb army cannot let any convoys transit without controlling the contents, Gvero stressed.

The Serbs also learn that the staff of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) received orders to leave their offices and territory of the Serb Bosnian Republic during the day, Gvero continued.

"We are checking the information and if it turns to be true we will prevent them from leaving our territory," the general said.

"We reject any ultimatums, and we are ready as always to cooperate as equals in a civilized way," Gvero said.

Gvero set out that neither of the latest UNPROFOR and UNHCR measures was provoked by actions or behavior of the Bosnian Serbs.

Humanitarian aid convoys for the Moslems have passed through the territory of the Bosnian Serb Republic easily and safely, the reports of UNPROFOR and UNHCR confirmed.

On the other side Moslems have often attacked and robbed humanitarian convoys, one of the latest incidents happened in Zenica (central Bosnia) when Moslems killed an Englishman, humanitarian aid truck driver.

Gvero commented the decision as the intensification of recent different pressures on and threats to the Bosnian Serbs.

"We, as the whole civilized world, consider control as a method of building confidence, not limiting of the freedom of movement. It would not be good to create artificially in this way situations conducive to incidents which would then serve as a pretext for hasty reckless other actions," Gvero said in the end.

Article Criticizes HDZ Attacks on Opposition

AU0902173694 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 94 p 5

[Article by Zeljko Kruselj: "Faith in Conspiracy"]

[Text] The already well-known report from the fourth session of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] Presidency on "the current political situation in Croatia" has recently also been published in THE HDZ HERALD. The report's significance lies in the fact that it was accompanied by a picture of the participants of the session, which is supposed to do most to deny "malicious misinformation about the alleged rift in the HDZ and replacement of its officials." In that picture, Stipe Mesic and Gojko Susak were seated next to Franjo Tudjman, and the seating arrangements—to the president's left and to his right—"ideologically" mirrors the division within the party, and so does the position of other "polemists."

However, the problem lies in the fact that the latest attempt to homogenize the ruling party should be secured primarily by means of a fierce attack on the opposition, which was this time accused of "destabilizing the democratic system." The report says that "the moves and demands of some opposition parties lead to a constitutional crisis and early elections, and thus obviously jeopardize the internal stability and the international position of the Republic of Croatia," and that their goal is "to cause dissatisfaction among the people and even stimulate strikes" in order to "provoke a constitutional crisis and overthrow the authorities."

"Scenario From Abroad"

Jure Radic, HDZ secretary general, was even more direct during his visit last week to the county of Dubrovnik and Neretva, accusing unmentioned parties of betraying national interests. He spoke of "unwritten scenarios from abroad on how to destroy Croatian authorities that were elected in a democratic manner," and added that "some opposition parties have been receiving such scenarios for six months." The sharpness of Radic's statement may stem from the fact that he made it in Cavtat, i.e., exactly where the present authorities are being severely criticized for negotiating the possible "trading of the territory of southern Dalmatia," so it would be wise to redirect the wrath of the inhabitants of Konavli to something else. It is, however, more probable that the statement was a part of a more general pressure on the opposition, so that the ruling party could take the political initiative to the full.

Anyway, if we analyze the opening statement of President Tudjman at the said session of the HDZ Presidency, the inevitable conclusion is that black days are ahead for opposition parties, especially for those with large memberships. Referring to the necessity for "unified national politics," the Croatian president elaborated on the "scenario" for "causing a constitutional crisis," and the only argument he presented were "written guidelines" from abroad sent to "a party." He did not say whether the unmentioned party required those "guidelines" itself and implemented them in its political practice, as if those "details are not important at all." The fact that Radic, on the other hand, came up with several instead of just one party is just a consequence of an intellectually well-organized political campaign directed against Tudjman's non-party opponents, for example against "the six" who demanded his resignation last fall, but also against the press and trade unions.

Tudjman's speech to the 15 "apostles," obviously also designed to make them see which of them is the HDZ "Judas," shows that the ruling party cannot break free from the "conspiracy" syndrome typical of one-party systems. Commonplace political fighting, which also consists of contacts with similar parties abroad, is thus consciously turned into "undermining the foundations of the state," which, as a logical countermeasure, could result in introducing some elements of open police and court repression.

Another proof that this method is worthwhile is what happened with Paraga's Croatian Rights Party [HSP]. The party's political extremism did not encounter resistance when it was beneficial for the authorities, when it made it easier for them to gather volunteers for the war. But after the political situation had settled, the HSP was accused of something that could not actually even be proven. HSP leaders were eventually acquitted of charges that they attempted to "undermine the constitutional system," but the goal of that show has nevertheless been realized: Paraga has been totally discredited and the HSP marginalized. Moreover, the late Ivan Cesar, who was separately working on gathering Croatian Christian Democrats, was ridiculed in the famous documentary about Bruno Busic.

Something like that now also threatens the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS], the only party that can now undermine the present political monopoly of the HDZ. Regarding the liberals, the problem does not lie in "instructions from abroad" or if the president and the secretary general of the ruling party consider them "conspirators" at all. Budisa's followers, according to Tudjman, jeopardize Croatian interests for more global strategic reasons. The key problem, therefore, is the fact that the HSLS has assimilated into the typical framework of "liberal-democratic" understanding of national question in post-communist Europe. According to Tudjman, it was that option that was "directed toward preserving Yugoslavia and secretly hoped for the defeat of Croatia in 1991, especially this Croatia, sovereign and on its own."

Launching Against the HSLS

Consequently, the conclusion of the Croatian president is even more explicit and unrelenting: "The liberal-civic concept is looking for support in the strata of the Croatian psyche, and it gets it, not only from those who feel nostalgia for Yugoslavia, but also from those preoccupied by those wide universalist, cosmopolitan ideas....

It has been trying to prevent the HDZ from winning the elections, since it could not prevent Tudjman from being elected (at the latest elections), in order to be able, through weakening the coalition or by means of concessions to each other, to redirect Croatian politics."

What is even more interesting, at the session of the HDZ Presidency, Tudjman also pointed his political cutting edge toward the "Catholic-universalist" concept from which European Christian Democracy stems. The Croatian president is convinced that international diplomacy today also uses Catholicism to thwart authentic Croatian interests. To be more precise, the matter at issue is a statement by Pope John Paul II, of 4 January this year, in which he made a hypothetical reference to "the community of southern Slavs." For Tudjman, that was a clear sign of a turning point in the official politics of the Vatican, especially as some 10 days later, the Pope condemned "extreme nationalism": "Therefore, from the viewpoint of world Christianity and from the viewpoint of Catholicism, the Croats are entrusted with again being a bridge toward the Orthodox creed for uniting Christianity. To that effect it was announced that, if there is peace and should the Holy Father accept the invitation and visit Croatia, in addition to Zagreb, he would visit both Sarajevo and Belgrade."

Finding a global "conspiracy" in intertwining liberal-civic and Catholic-universalist options, and considering the past repugnance to social-democratic views on the Croatian reality on the international scene, Tudjman is becoming more and more lonely, which may have negative repercussions for settling conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia. In public, the responsibility for that will, of course, be redirected to the "subversive" activities of some opposition parties, primarily those that openly oppose Croatian politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If that should not prove successful enough, then the possibility that "some party members who are not willing to enforce the state politics may leave," as Jure Radic announced directly in Cavtat. Tudjman, as we know, does not advocate "disturbing the balance" in the party. It is still safer to shift the burden of blame for present and future failures of Croatian politics onto his opponents.

The opposition, on the other hand, is still not capable of using the weaknesses of the ruling party to its advantage, although Tudjman's followers have probably reached their all-time low in their five-year history. Before the press, Drazen Budisa openly admits that the popularity of his party "has fallen in relation to the post-election period," and he is also aware of the negative effects "of a fierce media campaign" that is systematically directed against the liberals. Stipac's Croatian Peasant's Party, as the only party that is gradually ramifying the network of its branches, has actually never dealt with "high politics," except for the personal frustrations of its president regarding the events in central Bosnia. Savka's Croatian National Party, which the ruling party ironically refers to as "nationalists without people," cannot get over the debacle that happened a year and a half ago.

The Left keep talking about their unification and it will never come, so that only Racan's social democrats are present in the public, mostly regarding social questions. The Right is even more disoriented, so that a possible unification would not make them a major political party.

Dalmatian regionalists contracted Paraga's "disease," and they have to prove their innocence in court, while the Istrian Democratic Congress is becoming more and more like an "Istrian HDZ," regarding the fact that there is a strong conflict of political factions in the party. And finally, Serbian parties and forums are not a real opposition either, but only serve as "test balloons" of official Croatian politics.

Why Is Tudjman Concerned?

Bearing in mind those realities regarding the opposition, it becomes even more vague why Tudjman is so concerned about rumors about "overthrowing the legal Croatian authorities." If that is just political "scenography" for unpopular moves on the domestic and international scene, especially regarding the peace accord between Zagreb and Belgrade, then this game makes some sense. If, on the other hand, the political public is being forcefully "disciplined," Croatia will soon have to deal with more trouble.

Greek Spokesman on U.S. Recognition of Macedonia

NC1002000794 Athens ET-1 Television Network in Greek 2130 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Excerpts] The United States today officially recognized the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYRM] and said it will establish full diplomatic relations with it. A statement issued by the White House notes that the decision was made in recognition of the democratic expression by FYROM of the duty to establish a sovereign and independent state based on democratic principles. The full recognition was announced today but full diplomatic relations will be established when Skopje gives assurances that it will cooperate constructively for the settlement of its dispute with Greece, a U.S. ally for many years, as the statement points out. [passage omitted]

Skopje President Kiro Gligorov, who constantly refers to his country as the Republic of Macedonia, said that its independence and stability are a prerequisite for peace and stability in the Balkans. He also noted that good-neighborliness is a vital interest of his country and that Skopje is prepared to begin immediately to negotiate with Greece within the UN framework in goodwill and a desire for mutual understanding and respect for mutual interests. He also said that his country respects the territorial integrity and borders of Greece and of all the neighboring countries.

In Athens, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou tonight received U.S. Ambassador to Greece Thomas Niles, who conveyed to him an official invitation from President Bill Clinton to visit the United States in April.

On the U.S. recognition of Skopje, government spokesman Evangelos Venizelos made the following statement: The Greek Government expresses its discontent at the U.S. decision to recognize Skopje. This development is certainly not pleasant for Greece. It is a wrong move by the United States. However, it is a significant fact that the United States is specifically reserved about diplomatic relations with Skopje and links it with conditions that refer to Skopje's hostile propaganda against Greece and to a respect for human rights. [passage omitted]

There has also been strong reaction by the opposition. New Democracy chairman Miltiadhis Evert described the U.S. decision as a bad option and added that the Greek Government was taken by surprise and was confused.

Foreign Minister Comments

NC1002000894 Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network in Greek 2200 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias returned from Geneva late this evening. Our political correspondent Mirela Kalostipi has the following telephone dispatch with details:

[Begin Kolostipi recording] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. The foreign minister returned from Geneva a short while ago. Naturally, correspondents were waiting for him at the airport and he made a statement.

Concerning the question of U.S. diplomatic recognition of Skopje, the foreign minister was asked whether the Skopjeans now have a reason to withdraw from their intransigent positions. Mr. Papoulias said that the form of recognition has room for the U.S. diplomacy. Today the foreign minister said the same thing he said when he returned from his visit to the United States. He made the appraisal that the normalization of Athens-Skopje relations is of more interest to Washington than any recognition. In any case, the foreign minister admitted that this development was not pleasant for Athens but added that on the chess board of international relations and balances the Greek Government aims at exploiting whatever is best.

Mr. Papoulias was asked about the statement by Andonios Samaras [opposition Political Spring party chairman] today that the U.S. diplomatic recognition of Skopje would have a negative effect on Greek-U.S. relations. Mr. Papoulias said he would not like to comment on this statement by Andonios Samaras. However, he said, in a critical period Andonios Samaras, who is a former foreign minister, should be more careful in his statements because, as Mr. Papoulias noted, he knows how difficult the issues are and how sensitive this period is.

The foreign minister was then asked about the Bosnian issue and the imminent decision regarding bombing Serbian targets around Sarajevo. Mr. Papoulias said that Greece's reservations are a clear answer to the "No" that we have already given on military interventions because, as he stressed, we have not been convinced by the arguments of those who support the bombings as to what will happen the next day. I do not bring any messages of optimism, Mr. Papoulias said, because many times we have had experiences of agreements that were upset the next day. Nevertheless, he stressed, the latest news is such that they might turn a NATO decision for bombings out of context.

This is all from the airport where Karolos Papoulias returned from Geneva late this evening. [end recording]

President Views Domestic, Foreign Issues

AU0902160294 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 94 pp 6-7

[Interview with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov by Stojan Obradovic (Stina); place and date not given: "National Exclusivity Leads to Ghettoization"]

[Text] Although Macedonia has not yet solved many problems regarding its international status—though it also has many domestic tensions—and the shadow of the possible war is still hanging over this area, it seems that Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov should not lose

any sleep over whether he will win the next elections. Public opinion polls show that he is supported by approximately 90 percent of the electoral body. What is even more interesting is that, regardless of the fact that the Macedonian political scene is extremely turbulent and divided, Gligorov not only gets support from "his own," but is also strongly supported by the Albanian population and the voters of the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity [VMRO-DPMNE], whose party is usually very critical of many of his moves and even accuses him of "national treason" for allegedly flirting with the idea of changing the name of the country, the flag, and so forth. However, it seems that ordinary people appreciate Gligorov's experienced—perhaps even cunning or wise, if you like—but extremely efficient way of solving problem after problem, many of which are labeled "to be or not to be," in the stirred-up situation in Macedonia and its neighborhood. Many say the fact that he built his authority on the other side of the famous Balkan populist leadership, having imposed some other qualities, did a world of good for Gligorov. One of those qualities—bearing those who criticize him no hard feelings, as he probably considers it part of his job—came to the surface when we were setting up this interview. We met him at the celebration of the most influential Macedonian weekly PULS, also famous for its ruthless depiction of the dark side of the Macedonian political scene, the weekly that often has no mercy for Gligorov himself. Asked why he attended the celebration of a newspaper that often criticizes and attacks him, he replied that, as we all know, the authorities are not immaculate, and the job of the media, among other things, is to remind the authorities of that. At the beginning of the interview, we "reminded" President Gligorov of the burning Macedonian problem—relations with Greece.

Talks, Not Skirmish, With Greece

[Obradovic] At the recently held session of the Greek Parliament, Papandreu has again said they would not recognize Macedonia under its name. Naturally and most importantly, European powers recognized Macedonia, but solving the problem of relations with Greece is important for stability of this region and for Greek-Macedonian relations. What do you think will be the final solution?

[Gligorov] I think the most natural way would be to continue the talks we began under the auspices of the United Nations and Mr. Vance. We managed to make a few steps forward in those negotiations, but then they were interrupted by Greece for understandable reasons—they went to the elections, which are now over. Now they have a new government and we must continue to negotiate. That is the only possible way. Everything else—skirmishing, stipulating terms for the beginning of the negotiations—should not be happening between two members of the United Nations, and would ultimately produce no results. Things will get better eventually.

Differentiation Among the Macedonian Albanians

[Obradovic] Albanian-Macedonian relations are evidently one of the most important internal problems of Macedonia. Those relations are burdened by many problems and things got worse after it was discovered that the Albanians had weapons. Is it possible control over those relations could be lost and that this would escalate into a conflict?

[Gligorov] I do not expect that. What is happening in Albanian parties is something normal in a law-ordered, democratic country—people are gradually being divided according to their views on some problems.

The worst possible thing is when a nation, any nation, is homogenized around certain demands, especially if they become extremely nationalistic. That would lead to separation, not to mention the ghettoization of certain parts of the population. Some Albanians are undergoing a kind of political differentiation. Basically, I appreciate that, for it is actually a democratic process. It is another matter that third parties are becoming involved in the internal discussions in some Albanian parties. That is impermissible and bad, for that means interfering in our domestic problems.

Otherwise, I view this process of differentiation as a will of a huge majority of people who want their Macedonia to become a state, i.e. of those people who consider it their homeland. On the other side, there are extremists who still dream of greater Albania.

[Obradovic] You mentioned interference of a third side. I suppose you meant Albania. Do you intend to start negotiating with them and ask them not to do that?

[Gligorov] We talk to them and I think it would be normal to continue doing that, as well as to establish internationally recognized norms of behavior that will strengthen and develop our cooperation. We had a good cooperation for a while, and we must overcome these events.

Toward "Partnership for Peace"

[Obradovic] Macedonia has welcomed President Clinton's initiative regarding the restructuring of NATO and the "Partnership for Peace" project. Are there any chances for Macedonia to become involved in that project?

[Gligorov] We have already applied to participate in "Partnership for Peace" and, in my opinion, the only hindrance is that we are still not a member of the CSCE [Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe] because Greece objects to that. If we manage to overcome that, all members of the CSCE have, in principle, the right and the possibility to participate in that association. I think that Macedonia satisfies all conditions for becoming a member of "Partnership for Peace" association in every way.

[Obradovic] Do you think one will be able to break the resistance of Greece soon? What condition have they set?

[Gligorov] I cannot predict when, but I think it cannot be postponed simply because Greece is practically the only country that opposes our becoming a member of the CSCE. Therefore, on one hand, we will try to continue negotiating with Greece and, on the other, we will try to realize that goal within the CSCE.

Life Wants an Agreement

[Obradovic] Macedonia is, naturally, still not involved in the war, but it cannot ignore the events on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Can you comment on the latest agreement between Tudjman and Milosevic?

[Gligorov] As a country that, first of all, strives toward peace, negotiations, tolerance, solving the global situation in the Balkans, and finding points of contact for future cooperation, we welcome every step in realizing those goals. It is difficult for me to comment on what lies behind this agreement and what could be its consequences.

Some say it has something to do with the agreement made in Karadjordjevo, others that it is an interim agreement made in order to force the Muslims to sign the peace agreement under conditions arranged between the two sides. However, one must also consider huge interests in the normalization of relations between the two countries; the main traffic route was interrupted, and so were the oil pipeline and telephone communications, but one must go on living, one must find some points of contact to start taking practical steps in order to overcome the atmosphere of war. I think the agreement is a wide and complex matter and that it must be considered from different aspects.

[Obradovic] Some say that Macedonia is yet to face certain problems regarding the fact that it must start restructuring its economy, and that social tensions will probably increase, and that it must realize an economic program that requires some sacrifice, etc. Can that further complicate the domestic situation in Macedonia?

[Gligorov] In the present situation, when there are sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, our road toward Europe in the north is getting narrower and narrower. Furthermore, considering the open problem with Greece, introducing daring reforms, market institutions, and making an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank for a stabilization program is a very brave and a risky undertaking. But, on the other hand, I think delaying it would complicate the situation.

A Tough Nut To Crack

[Gligorov] As other examples show, delaying reforms, deeper but inevitable changes, cannot buy time. There is just a temporary illusion that the situation is under control, but the right thing to do is to crack a tough nut, and it will be a very tough one indeed. In my opinion, there is no other way. I hope that the people of Macedonia—considering what we went through, that we managed to maintain peace and tranquillity—will understand this is a step we must make so that, when the war ends, in the process of normalization, we could use this advantage, the fact that we were not involved in the war, to develop and arrange relations with other Eastern-European countries and with our neighbors. That must be an additional stimulus for us to succeed in this undertaking.

Favoring the Moderate Option

[Obradovic] New elections are supposed to be organized in Macedonia this fall. Do you expect some extreme options, whether Macedonian or Albanian, to get stronger at those elections, which could lead to straining political relations and the situation in Macedonia?

[Gligorov] This is a regular election year in Macedonia and the elections may be a burden to some extent. Passions are always intensified in the election year, demands are maximized, people do things that trigger emotional reactions, conflicts. We must count on all that. However, I think the experience we gathered in the past two or three years, as well as global events in these parts have taught us we should look for peaceful solutions for our future. The people saw that the politics of extreme options does not lead anywhere. And the fact that extreme nationalism did not win here helped us to stay out of the war; otherwise, we would also be in the maelstrom of war. Naturally, I think it is not impossible that passion will be stirred up again, but in view of what I have just said, I think people are now aware of certain things and that they will favor the moderate option.

[Box, p 6]

U.S. "Blue Helmets"—a Warning

[Obradovic] The forces of the United Nations are here in Macedonia. Is that a certain guarantee that there will be peace in Macedonia and what do you think about their role?

[Gligorov] That is a relatively small contingent. As a military force, it does not bring any significant changes in relations in these parts. However, their presence is of enormous political and psychological significance. In the political sense, it demonstrates the interest of the international community in the situation in Macedonia. I think the international community has, on time, realized the geostrategic importance of Macedonia for the global stability of this part of the Balkans in particular, as a pivotal area for which, as you know, there have been many battles and wars in history. Therefore, the mission of peace-keeping forces has a dual role. One is to prevent—therefore, those forces do not act after a conflict happens, they do not separate warring factions, but analyze the situation in order to predict possible conflicts and thus prevent them. In that sense, Macedonia is a very good example. The other role is that the presence

of UN forces, especially of the contingent of U.S. soldiers, presents a kind of warning, a message to all who have a vested interest in Macedonia that, in case of conflicts or some events that would further complicate the situation with regard to the war raging in the north, it will simply not be accepted.

[Box, p 7]

Overcome Extreme Demands

[Obradovic] Do you think that the rights of the Albanian minority in Macedonia have been protected in the right way or should some significant changes occur with regard to that?

[Gligorov] Regarding the constitutional position of all minorities in Macedonia, I think their rights were rightfully established and protected. Many missions of the CSCE and other institutions came here to assess constitutional solutions. Among others, the well-known Badinter's Commission made up of Europe's top lawyers and presidents of constitutional courts, has also confirmed that those rights were protected. Much is yet to be accomplished in practice on both sides—on one side, to transform that into everyday decisions that will in turn enable us to reduce tensions and, on the other, to eliminate some extreme demands that have not been fulfilled in any European country and that could only lead to increasing tensions. I think those demands are, first of all, a reflection of what is going on in republics of former Yugoslavia, i.e. in the Balkans, with regard to extremist nationalism and extreme demands that go far beyond what we are supposed to grant—first of all, to strive toward building a civic state, then toward the European option, and then toward alleviating, opening up borders and barriers and thus enable free passage of people, creating new jobs, letting people decide where and how to live, in contrast to present desires of each of those countries to realize their own exclusively historic, national and some other pretensions, which can lead to escalation of those conflicts.

Serbia

Karadzic on Ultimatum, Possible Air Strikes

AU0902203294 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] As we have learned, Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade today. After the talks, correspondents of foreign television stations overwhelmed President Karadzic with questions about threats of air strikes. Let us hear how Dr. Karadzic answered:

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Please comment on the statement by French Foreign Minister Juppe that he will demand an ultimatum for the Serbs, 10 days to withdraw 20 [words indistinct].

[Karadzic] Minister Juppe should ask [Austrian Foreign] Minister Mock about the fate of the Austrian ultimatum in 1914.

[Unidentified correspondent, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] Will you withdraw your artillery from the positions around Sarajevo?

[Karadzic, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] Immediately, as soon as we sign the peace plan.

[Unidentified correspondent, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] The NATO secretary general today said that it was high time to do something in Bosnia. How would you comment on this?

[Karadzic, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] Well, had they taken no actions in the former Yugoslavia, it would not have disintegrated. I would love it if they would not meddle into our affairs at all, because, it is precisely they who have caused this war.

[Unidentified correspondent, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] What will happen if the NATO Council issues an ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw from their positions around Sarajevo?

[Karadzic, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] How can we withdraw from Sarajevo? Sarajevo is not a surrounded town, but a divided town. We hold half of the town. If somebody is asking us to give up our own town, then no, never, out of the question.

[Unidentified correspondent, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] Do you believe in air strikes, Mr. Karadzic?

[Karadzic, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] I believe in God. [end recording]

Milosevic, Draskovic on Parliament Delay

AU0902204094 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] As we have learned, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic met with Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] today. Let us hear what Vuk Draskovic stated to POLITIKA Television after the meeting with President Milosevic:

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] You were with President Milosevic. Can you tell us what you discussed?

[Draskovic] We discussed the reasons for the delay in the formation of the parliament, which is a peculiar form of obstruction. I informed the president of the fact that this obstruction cannot be overcome without a political agreement. To the president's words that he favored a government of national unity, I replied that, regarding the SPO and DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia], we want more than that; national unity. However, in this, the SPO, naturally, wishes to carry some of the responsibility for the atmosphere in the parliamentary life of the country—Serbia and the federal state. Regarding government, we do not wish to take part in any government, be it republican or federal, and this was my stance. [end recording]

Kosovo

Rugova Views Visit to U.S., Solution to Kosovo

AU1002085494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1845 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Interview with Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosova, by Sali Kelmendi in Tirana; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Kelmendi] Good evening, dear viewers. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosova, recently visited the United States, where he held talks with top U.S. personalities—President Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, the secretary of state, his assistants, and U.S. congressmen. Can you please inform our viewers about your trip and assess the talks you held there?

[Rugova] My visit to the United States was very successful. As you know, we have had continuous contacts with the United States, the U.S. Congress, the Senate, and the State Department. We had the honor and special pleasure to meet President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore and their wives. President Clinton personally expressed special gratitude to our peaceful movement and the contribution that we have made to the stability in the region, as well as continued support of the United States on the Kosova issue and the Albanian question. Vice President Al Gore, who was already familiar with the Kosova question, also expressed his own support to the Kosova issue and a peaceful solution to this question.

It was a special honor to attend the international prayer, which has been held for more than 30 years in the United States, where Mother Teresa was one of the central figures concerning the Albanian question. Our presence at the morning prayer was marked as an Albanian day in Washington and an affirmation of our people. It was these particular moments that made the visit a very successful and important one, particularly the meeting with the U.S. President.

[Kelmendi] During the talks you held with high-level U.S. personalities, you informed them about the grave situation in Kosova, especially the repression and violence of the Serbian occupying power, the economic situation, the humanitarian question, and human rights and freedoms. What do the U.S. officials think about these problems?

[Rugova] The United States, the U.S. Congress, and the State Department know the situation in Kosova quite well. As you know, they publish annual reports on Kosova, particularly the State Department, on human rights. The last report was published recently, and we received a copy while we were there. The attitude is to support and assist Kosova in the future. Several aid supplies administered by the U.S. Congress two years ago and last year have arrived in Kosova this year, and they amount to several million dollars. This was the concrete assistance that has arrived in Kosova. Of course, I can also mention the political and diplomatic assistance that will be extended to Kosova in the future, as well as the good disposition on the Kosova issue that has existed in U.S. state institutions for years.

[Kelmendi] President Clinton and U.S. Secretary of State Christopher have several times asserted that they will not allow the war to spread to Kosova, i.e., to the south front. At the same time, the congressmen with whom you talked declared that they will draft new resolutions on the question of Kosova and they will support Kosova. How do you assess these stands, and what do you expect in the near future in this direction?

[Rugova] The U.S. officials asserted that what President Clinton and Mr. Christopher have said are serious statements, so we will continue to wait for all these institutions to move ahead on the Kosova question.

[Kelmendi] Mr. Chairman, let us go back to the end of last year. You conducted a long tour of some European countries. You were received by foreign ministers of those countries and state ministers as well. This was, undoubtedly, a recognition of Kosova's subjectivity and your legitimacy as president of the republic of Kosova. After the talks with European and U.S. personalities, how do you assess the situation in Kosova? What do you expect this year? Is this a further acceleration toward a peaceful solution of the Kosova question?

[Rugova] This is an increasingly great affirmation. As you know, the tour I conducted at the end of last year in Europe and this one in the United States is an increasingly great affirmation of the Kosova issue and an international subjectiveness or an international element of Kosova and its further legitimacy. As you know and as we have often said, these questions make up a process; thus, we should be organized, have more contacts, and especially arrange a better organization in Kosova. All these would be a contribution for the solution of the Kosova question through peaceful and political means. To tell the truth, everyone is concerned that no conflict or new tragedy occurs in Kosova. That is why preventive measures should be taken to avoid the worse, which would be very tragic for the region and Kosova itself.

[Kelmendi] It is assessed that further sanctions against Serbia will be one of the elements that will help to solve the crisis in Kosova, and perhaps to stop the war in Bosnia. Did you talk about the continuation of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, and are they in a way connected to the situation in Kosova?

[Rugova] Concretely, in the United States we asserted that these sanctions will not be abolished, but may be further intensified. They are a means to exert pressure on Serbia, with regard not only to other issues such as Bosnia and Croatia in former Yugoslavia, but also to Kosova, because Kosova as well is included in these conditions for the abolishment of sanctions. For the moment we cannot talk about the abolishment of sanctions, which certainly will be intensified.

[Kelmendi] Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg have summoned a conference in Geneva today with the participation of the neighboring countries of former Yugoslavia; they have called it a consultative conference. What do you think, will this conference discuss the question of Kosova? Will this be a further step forward toward the solution of the Kosova problem, especially when President Berisha declared that without solving the Kosova issue there cannot be a solution of the Balkan problems?

[Rugova] I agree with President Berisha's statement and I consider this conference or this consultative meeting as a consultation about the issues in former Yugoslavia which, of course, the neighboring countries are interested in as well. As you know, the neighboring countries were present at the London conference. However, this was more an international meeting where they had no possibility to tell their viewpoints so openly, as far as I can remember. For us it is important because Albania is there and of course, Albania will put forward the question of Kosova and that of the Albanians living in their ethnic territories. That is, this is important. It is a bit early to say that this will be a step forward or a more positive step. However, as a consultation it should be greeted. Of course, even a solution to this problem will not be successful without the neighboring countries and a global approach to all the problems in former Yugoslavia, because this was one of the central states of the Balkans.

[Kelmendi] We hope that the affirmation of Kosova in the international relations will soon bring Kosova to the

table for talks at the required level as you have always demanded, as one of the ex-units of former Yugoslavia, where a solution will be found in conformity with the people's will expressed in a referendum.

[Rugova] We hope and we are working in this direction. As for a peaceful and political solution, of course we have thought about it. We have requested international protection, a system of civil protectorate that is more advanced, so as to normalize life and institutions and then we can talk about the question of Kosova. As we have mentioned several times, this is an idea and question that is transmitted with interest by all institutions, be they European, U.S., or international ones.

[Kelmendi] Mr. President, your meeting with President Clinton is the first meeting of a Kosova president or a Kosova representative with the U.S. President. This occasion reminds us of the commitment of the former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Can you tell us something for our viewers, how did this meeting pass and in what atmosphere?

[Rugova] It was the first time that Kosova was accepted at this level and the contact and talks were recognized. I can personally say that it was a warm meeting with a great human empathy on the part of President Clinton, which I had the occasion to see directly. He had a great understanding on the question of Kosova. Concerning the relation to President Wilson, both are Democrats. However, this is not of great importance, but I can say that the President of that time, President Wilson, was a great man who managed to put the question of Albania outside the question of the Adriatic, which meant the partition of the Albanian question. I can say that his well-known 14 Points, a program for the security of democracy in the world, were followed by President Bush with the collapse of communism in the East. And today we find the same vocabulary in President Clinton's policy, so as to promote a world security or in this case, a European security, for the development of democracy, which is very important. As a matter of fact, President Clinton is a man of peace, understanding, and democracy. I had the occasion to see this in my personal meeting with him which was, I can say once again, a special honor to me and the people of Kosova and the Albanians. I thank you very much, greeting the viewers of this television satellite program as well.

[Kelmendi] Thank you.

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